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**SECRET**

RECOMMENDATIONS: At the end of the trip I came to the conclusion that all these feelings were not so deep rooted, but yet a rumor campaign alone would be inadequate and ineffective. In order that we may accomplish our task, we have to resort to some printed materials also, which does come under the jurisdiction to O.W.I. It is only by such combination, can we accomplish our mission.

POLICY: Well by the time I returned to Cairo, I found that the MO Branch was not interested to operate in the Middle East, but were concentrating all their efforts to the Balkans, as well as to Greece and Turkey. They mentioned the Directive of the Chiefs of Staffs, which prohibit us from operating in the M.E. This policy is still prevailing at the present time. Even State Department officials objected to our operating in that theatre, being a British sphere of influence.

RETURN: After staying in Cairo for a while, the MO Branch loaned me to SI-NE to do some commercial study in Palestine, which was requested of them by F.E.A. At the completion of the work, I saw Lieut. Col. West who suggested my returning to the States, as there is not much we can do there, and to which I acceded.

RESIGNATION: Now that I am back, I herewith tender my resignation to return to private life, but shall always be at the disposal of the O.S.S. Organization, for any future consultations. I may be reached at the following address: 150 Broadway, New York 7, N. Y.

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On my arrival to Cairo, I reported to Lieut. Col. West, and later to Mr. Ben Ames, who had just taken charge of the MO Branch. They decided that I take a trip around the Middle East, and so I travelled under cover of making a Post-War trade study in the Middle East for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and my credentials were drawn accordingly.

FINDINGS: The attitude of the majority of the people were anti-British and consequently pro-German. They believe a British Victory will shatter all their future hopes for complete independence, particularly in the case of Palestine. As regards the Atlantic Charter, they heard it often said by responsible British officials, that this charter would not apply East of Suez. So they are afraid that they shall not be better off after the war, than they were before it. However, there is one sign of encouragement as far as we Americans are concerned, and that most of the Arabs look to us as champions of freedom and democracy, especially after the role we played in the Independence of Lebanon. Yet at times they get pessimistic and say that America is being controlled and run by the Jews, and therefore no matter how willing or sympathetic the people are to their cause, the Government would not dare do anything which is contrary to Jewish aspirations or interests. They claim that President Roosevelt is pro-Jewish, and they stress the fact that he is surrounded by a number of Jewish advisers. The Arabs also believe that the British can at any time out-smart the Americans in the field of International Politics, and will eventually have their own way in the Middle East.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**REPORT ON TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EASTField report 14,921  
Summary 12, 1160

TO: Mr. R. J. Pershall, MO Branch

FROM: Mr. Edward S. Sununu

TRAVEL: Left by steamer on October 14, 1943, and sixteen days later landed at Oran. From there we went to Algiers, and finally secured a plane priority, arriving at Cairo on November 21, 1943.

INCIDENT EN ROUTE: May I at the outset register an incident which I believe is of great importance and which should be watched carefully in the future. At the time of embarkation, there were five Yugoslav civilians with us who belonged to the SO Branch, carrying revolvers and radio receivers with them. At the docks the Customs Officers inspected the luggage and insisted on displaying those articles right there, in front of everybody. They interrogated them in front of all sorts of people, without paying any attention to anything as security, especially when they were travelling under cover. This was resented by those Yugoslav men who were willing and ready to sacrifice their lives for the defeat of the enemy, but not to lose it so wittingly due to the stupidity of couple of officers. Therefore special attention should be maintained in the future to avoid any such incidents, which will endanger the lives of those men and defeat their missions, before they ever get a chance to accomplish anything. Security as preached so repeatedly in the training centers, should also be observed by all Government Agencies and at all times. There is no excuse for such blunders, especially when human lives are at stake.

**SECRET**



14721  
Field Report  
X Sununu, Edw S  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14  
1944 JUL 28 PM 3 34

OSS

27 Jul, 1944

TO: Reports Officer  
FROM: J. R. Pershall J.R.P.  
SUBJECT: Report by Edward S. Sununu

Inclosed herewith is a report submitted by Mr.  
Edward S. Sununu upon his return to this country.

This report has been reviewed by Colonel K. D. Mann,  
Mr. David Williamson, and Mr. J. R. Pershall of MO Branch.

1 Inclosure  
Report (4 copies)

SECRET



NOTES OF A GENERAL NATURE:

All of the parachutes we use, including those used by our agents, are British. Why this lack of American chutes. The supply chutes have to be repacked when obtained from the British, but if obtained from American sources they could be shipped, stamped and ready for use, thereby eliminating repacking which wastes a lot of time when you consider thousands of them being repacked. Sometimes they send white chutes which show up like a flare when used on Moonlit nights, but we have to use them nevertheless.

No one has actually had an encounter with a night fighter in the 343 sorties (205 successful) flown. We have lost five planes thus far. An example of what happens is illustrated by the story of Lt Ambrose's crew. They delivered their goods and were on their way back when they hit a mountain. (This was reported by the underground). The rear gunner was seriously injured; two men are making their way back via the underground and one other member of the crew is making his own way back without the help of the underground. The papers such as bombing charts, etc. were returned to England within three days after the crash. Lt Reardon thinks the underground would have been smarter not to risk this and feels it would have been safer to burn this evidence. It is, however, an example of speed by the underground and they did a splendid job.

The first plane to crash was the one piloted by Lt McDonald (over Belgium) which occurred on March 3rd. Lt McDonald's co-pilot is now back in England, having escaped through France with the help of the underground."

/s/ F. J. Reardon  
/t/ F. J. REARDON  
1st Lt., AC

*Ralph N. Elsom*  
RALPH N. ELSOM,  
1st Lt., Infantry,  
Maps and Reports Officer, WSSO

territory over which they were to fly - when the contact was made, the men on the ground could guide the plane by sight, or sound if dark and cloudy, to an approximate dropping spot, and we might also be able to pick up first-hand intelligence information. As it stands now, the British probably get better results only because of their attaching a native-speaking man to operate this simple plane-ground telephone.

#### IV. A. SITUATION:

- (a) Pick-up - Rescue work.  
Nothing being done.

#### B. POSSIBLE SOLUTION:

- (a) Lt Reardon talked to Major Brooks (now replaced by Major Cable) about his (Reardon's) talk with a British Group Captain, who was an old friend of his when he was with the RAF, by the name of Fieldon, who is C. O. of the RAF station at Tempsford (the British section of Harrington). Captain Fieldon, in collaboration with W/Cdr. Verrity (who has done 35 pick-ups for the British) arranged for OSS to get 6 Lysanders plus the British air facilities for escape - pick up and delivery - of agent personnel. Lt Reardon was enthusiastic about this and so were the men he had lined up for the job, but the scheme was side-tracked somewhere along the line. He feels that OSS should do something along this line, use the Lysanders (which after all are a great deal better than nothing - the reason they are not accepted as perfect being that they can only pick up 6 agents at once, while the C-47 can pick up 20) and do the best we can with them. Picking up these agents would be most valuable for getting recognition from the Partisan groups, who do not care if supplies come from us or the British (in fact do not from which) as long as they get them, but the men who are picked up know which country has done it and are accordingly appreciative. Lt Reardon admits that we could surpass the British if we would use our initiative and not wait around for the perfect type of plane but use what is there and the British were also willing to give us the facilities for training our pilots and crews on the Lysander planes.
- (b) He also feels we could out produce the British in anything we set out to do and as an example of this points out the fact that even though the British have been in the war game years longer than we, in four months' time our Harrington as against their Harrington can be judged by the following: In the last April-May moon period we delivered twice as many agents as they did, 50% more packages, and about 200 more containers - so this gives an idea of American production ability if given a chance. Lt Reardon feels that someone should begin working on this angle.

Reardon has experimented with these containers against the type used by the British and found them satisfactory for at least small arms and food. As these are at present our normal container load, we could use them for these without any worry about anything being broken or spoiled.. The actual reasons for not using them are that (1) The balance of the containers is not perfect and (2) They have never been used before. Another reason for using them is that the enlisted men at the packing station are always ahead of themselves in reference to what we're physically able to drop, and fill in the time drilling; but if these plastic containers were filled, the materials won't spoil, and when D-Day comes they will probably be glad to drop anything and everything in whatever containers they have, and then these would be ready in case the demand comes in.

### III. A. SITUATION:

- (a) Most of our drops are in the Moon period, and the Partisan groups would like non-moon drops, such as the British do, using Eureka-Rebecca radio sets.
- (b) S-Phone communication between plane and Partisan groups while delivering supplies, is the reason why we do not realize the results which the British do.

### B. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:

- (a) The British Eureka-Rebecca radio sets have a range of 89 miles to our 30, which makes our sets more or less useless because if a pilot can stay on his course up to thirty miles of the drop target, he does not have much worry. The radio set acts as a beacon for the pilot and with the poorer set, if he should miss his course because of bad weather conditions, etc., he is likely to go over a "Flak" town, which would not occur with the better set, and would also make flying in non-moon periods a great deal easier. Lt Reardon suggests that either OSS try to get some of these sets from the British or make one ourselves that is better than the one in use, which must be remembered has a maximum range of 30 miles and then only under perfect conditions.
- (b) S-Phone communication between aircraft and ground Reception Committees. The British have interpreters in the plane for the country over which they are flying and into which they intend dropping supplies. We have no interpreters and therefore do not get the full value from the S-Phone sets. As has actually happened we might be over a French area and all of a sudden our radio man picks up the French radio of the partisan groups. While this is helpful to us to the extent that even though our men don't understand what the Frenchman is saying, it helps guide the plane to some extent and one can suppose he is at the correct spot because of the contact, yet if we sent along on these missions men who understood the language of the

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**SECRET**

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan  
 FROM : Alvah W. Sulloway  
 SUBJECT:

14 809  
*Field Rm*  
 DATE: 14 July 1944  
*x Check on BA*  
*x Radio-FJ.*

We have discussed the attached report containing the observations of Lt. Reardon with Colonel Joseph Haskell who is of the opinion that it does not give an accurate picture of the situation. The specific points marked in red pencil have been met by Colonel Haskell as follows:

1. Proposal to obtain additional planes by familiarizing people like General Doolittle with our activities. Colonel Haskell states that the London office is conducting such tours constantly, and that we now have sufficient planes and crews to meet our requirements.
2. Proposal to establish a permanent Air School. Colonel Haskell believes that training of air crews has progressed satisfactorily and that more than enough have been trained to meet our needs.
3. Use of plastic containers. These containers are being used. Colonel Haskell points out that several thousand of them were sent to Algiers for use there.
4. Failure to use British type Eureka-Rebecca radio sets. According to Colonel Haskell all our planes have been fitted with the British type sets and that these are now being used rather than the American type which Lt. Reardon states are being used.
5. Proposal to use interpreters for S-Phone communication between aircraft and ground Reception Committees. Whereas

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Lt. Reardon states that the British use such interpreters and the Americans do not, Colonel Haskell states that quite the opposite is the case. It was our idea to train and use these interpreters and they are being used at the present time.

6. Procurement of Lysanders for pick-up work. Colonel Haskell advises that we now have four C-47's engaged in pick-up work, and that these planes are more satisfactory than the Lysanders.

7. American ability to out-produce the British in packing containers. Colonel Haskell states that everyone is agreed on this.

8. Lack of American parachutes. As a matter of fact a large number of American parachutes have been available but since the British chute has a larger canopy and does not tear as easily as the American chutes, many of our American parachutes have been traded for British chutes.

*Alvah W. Sulloway*  
Alvah W. Sulloway

**SECRET**

17,809

17 June 1944

(2)

TO: Major Carl O. Hoffman, Chief, SO

FROM: Lt Ralph N. Elamo, Maps and Reports Officer, WESO

SUBJECT: Report from Officer returning from Field.

1. This memorandum is submitted in compliance with General Donovan's instructions that all officers of OSS shall file a comprehensive report on field conditions on their return to Washington from the field.

2. Major Bruce B. Cheever, USMC, (former head of OSS parachute school England) returned to Washington around the 16th of May. His report deals with the OSS Parachute School located at Ringway Cheshire - 15 miles out of Manchester.

3. Major Cheever was relieved from duty with OSS the 13th of April. He was ordered back to the Marine Corps, having been on TD with OSS, and is now attending the War College.

4. His report as follows:

"The SO staff at the school, at the time of my leaving, consisted of Lt Arthur Hughes, G/Sgt. R. E. LaSalle, USMC, and Sgt. F. J. Brunner, USMC. The SOE representation consisted of the following: 1 Major C. O., 2 Captains ADM., and the Training Section consisting of 2 Captains, 2 Lts., 2 Sgts., and 1 Cpl. This understaff of SO against SOE personnel is not serious because it is felt that most of the parachute training is over with.

The output of trained "Parachute Personnel" never went over the maximum of 125 per week. When I left the school we were training about 50 a week, however, the future need of the school, considering the fact that most of the known candidates to be trained had already completed their course, looked very dull. Up to the time of my departure we had trained and qualified around 350.

The course, unless otherwise requested, lasts one week and consists of 3-day jumps and 1 night. The course, however, is made to order, therefore, anything which is taught one group (in addition to routine parachute instruction) would not necessarily be taught another.

The men jump from Whitley Bombers (British) and all jumps are static line. (Semi-fixed). The men use the British standard combat chute with a 28-foot canopy and which is made from either Nylon or Raymix. The men leave the plane through a hole in its bottom. The first man to leave the plane clears its tail by 18 inches the remainder of the men clear the tail by 3 feet. The men jump, as all British personnel do, with no reserve chute. No deaths to date and a very low average in minor injuries is a feat the school is proud of.

The housing of the men is done in 2 country homes. The ideal set-up is to house 50 men at one and 30 at the other, however, these figures are made for comfort. We can house more men if necessary.



The school is established with the intention of helping all personnel, whether young or old, to get through. There are no jump towers and extreme physical conditioning. Either the personnel are in condition when they report for training or else they jump "out of condition."

BRUCE B. CHEEVER,  
Major, USMC.

*Ralph N. Elsmo*  
RALPH N. ELSMO,  
1st Lt, Infantry,  
Maps and Reports Officer, WESO

11 507

H W N

16 June 1944

(1)

TO: Major Carl O. Hoffman, Chief, SO

FROM: Lt Ralph N. Elamo, Maps and Reports Officer, WESO

SUBJECT: Report from Officer returning from Field.

1. This memorandum is submitted in compliance with General Donovan's instructions that all officers of OSS shall file a comprehensive report on field conditions on their return to Washington from the field.

2. Lt Reardon (formerly with the RAF - now with the AAF) returned to Washington the latter part of May. His report deals primarily with the prevailing conditions and possible solutions governing our Airops at Harrington. Lt Reardon flew many missions for us, therefore, speaks from experience rather than observation.

3. His report as follows:

"For clarification, I will break down the contents under two headings: SITUATION and POSSIBLE SOLUTION.

I. A. SITUATION

- (a) In February we borrowed 100 containers from the British (Lt Reardon arranged the loan). These were dropped during the next two moon periods.
- (b) In March we borrowed 500 containers (only delivered 540 in March moon period).
- (c) In April we dropped 1300 containers and 800 packages (of these, Lt Reardon states that at least 1100 containers and 350 packages were American packed).
- (d) At Area "H" we pack only small arms and food ("A" rations and British COMPO rations). We do not possess the technical radio equipment, etc., which is necessary, therefore, they are obtained from the British.
- (e) Up until May 16th we dropped around 1500 containers (for this moon period).
- (f) 7500 plastic containers (ours obtained from the Navy) are located at Area "H" - in crates, four to a crate, piled five crates high, around "H" Area.

B. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: To I., A., a, b, c, d, and e.

Sometimes we are forced to substitute "K" rations and small arms for various items which we did not have, the substitution being merely to fill containers. We are still dependent on the British for such items as containers, French francs, Belgian money, technical radio equipment, etc. If the aforementioned difficulties could be ironed out, we would be self-sufficient.

II. A. SITUATION:

- (a) We have recently obtained 25 new crews, now undergoing training for this particular type of operations, but have not as yet received the additional planes we were promised. WHY? Lt Reardon feels it is because of lack of coordination due to lack of authoritative recognition.

B. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:

- (a) Sometime in March General Doolittle visited Area "H" and was given a Cook's Tour. The General was both pleased and amazed and then there promised OSS anything they wanted. Lt Reardon feels that the General is in back of us, but that he may pass down an O.K. for something for OSS to his Chiefs of Staff, who, not knowing of the activities of OSS, may basket any such request. At any event, our requests are not followed through. Lt Reardon feels that the so-called "Big Boys" should be given Cook's Tours (at least invited to come) whenever possible, which would give them a picture and understanding of exactly what OSS is doing, and our possibilities if given the necessary support.
- (b) Lt Reardon also feels that a permanent "Air School" for training crews for this type of Air Operation should be established, such as the one through which the 25 new crews are now going. He feels that the men in command, when they see on paper that so many crews are now in operation and 25 more assigned (at present without the planes), will be satisfied that the personnel situation is well in hand. This, however, is far from the case as the pilots and crews complete their 30 missions fast in this work; also we do lose planes and personnel occasionally and the pilots have to get rest from combat fatigue. We must keep up reserves, as two nights is the maximum the same crew can do in succession, as they are then exhausted, and are off for one night, when the planes also must be overhauled. Lt Reardon does not know definitely that there is no advanced planning along this line, but from his past experience thinks it unlikely.

REFERENCE TO PAGE 1 - POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO I.A.(f).

The reason for not using the plastic containers is because they are not exactly what we would like, a reason to which Lt Reardon agrees. However, we do have them and they can be used. (SI) uses them and drops two with every agent. Lt



OSS Form 2202a

FROM:

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 13149-705

Date Rec'd SA .....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1.	21047			Jm.	Out of date & inaccurate in spots. The author is after a captain commission. He was offered a Tech Rep status while chief in China & passed it. Consider it gone.
2.	DIRECTOR				
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Final Report 14866

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 25 July 1944

FROM : Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

SUBJECT: Field trip report - China - 30 March 1943 to 22 June 1944.

As of possible interest to you, I am transmitting herewith a report covering experiences in China and India by Mr. Robert K. Smith.

This report reflects a rather comprehensive survey and comment upon existing conditions in China which may be met by personnel of our organization.

*Roger A. Pfaff*  
 Roger A. Pfaff  
 Major, Inf.

Enclosure

To Col. John Campbell

Please read & return -

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CONFIDENTIAL

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Major Roger A. Pfaff, Acting Chief X-2  
 FROM: Robert K. Smith  
 DATE: 5 July 1944  
 SUBJECT: Field trip report - China - 30 March 1943 to June 22, 1944

With Mr. C. J. Smith and Mr. G. E. Adams I left the United States on March 30, 1943 on the U.S.S. Hermitage. We arrived at Bombay on May 11, 1943 and, after traveling across India to Calcutta by train, we were able to obtain immediate transportation on a China National Aviation Corporation plane to Chungking, which place we reached on May 17.

Mr. Adams was presumably representing the American Foreign Insurance Association, whereas Mr. Smith and I represented the American International Underwriters Corporation. To those who were curious about our reasons for coming out to China, we explained that our companies had sent us out on a joint survey of the China market; that we were not sure whether we would do any immediate business but that we wanted to check on future possibilities and at the same time take care of any service that our old customers might ask for. Mr. Smith and I also were able to state that we were prepared to service United States Life and Asia Life insurance policies, which in one way was the most logical reason for our remaining in China inasmuch as hundreds of individual life insurance policyholders had migrated from the coastal cities back into the interior. It soon became obvious that it would be most dangerous to accept any new fire and marine insurance in Free China. The currency was unsound, and, although the loss ratio was exceedingly small due to the elimination of any moral hazard, it was quite obvious to one and all that as soon as any overland communications opened up into Free China there would be a catastrophic amount of losses from people who found themselves stuck with inventories bought at high prices. We were offered many possibilities of securing reinsurance from Chinese companies and a survey was made of this company market. A report was sent back to our respective New York offices, but we had little hope that they would see their way clear to authorizing us to accept any of this reinsurance business. At the same time Mr. Adams and I were rather conspicuous in civilian clothes as we were obviously of draft age and the few foreign civilians in Chungking were for the most part over forty years of age.

Feeling that it would be unwise to remain in Chungking and attract attention, particularly when we were not doing any active business, it was decided that we should move out to some smaller city, preferable down-country, where we might be able to pick up some worthwhile data on both the enemy and internal Chinese conditions. An opportunity to do this presented itself when Mr. J. Arthur Duff, who had already obtained connections with the United China Relief, procured a job for us with the Kwangtung International Relief Committee (the U.C.R. committee for that province). It was explained to both the relief

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Memo to:  
Major Roger A. Pfaff

5 July 1944

2.

authorities in Chungking and in Kwangtung that we had come out to China for our insurance employers but that it would take some time for them to obtain and study the insurance reports we had sent back to them. Consequently, in the interim, both of our employers were willing to offer our services to the U.C.R. on a voluntary basis and that our employers would take care of our salaries and expenses.

Accordingly, we left Chungking in the middle of June and by good fortune were able to obtain military plane transportation to Kweilin. From Kweilin we traveled to Kukong, the provincial capital of Kwangtung Province and the headquarters of the relief committee there. We arrived in Kukong on July 1, 1943.

For the next two months Mr. Adams and I, along with Mr. Duff, worked on the relief situation in Kukong with both the Chinese relief people and Mr. Edward Lockwood, an American Y.M.C.A. man who was the head of the local committee. It was agreed that Mr. Adams would remain in Kukong and take Mr. Lockwood's place while the latter went on a two months' vacation and that I would travel down to the famine area in Toishan - some ninety miles below Canton - with Mr. Duff. During these first two months in Kukong we orientated ourselves to the local situation and obtained information from refugees coming up from Canton and Hongkong. This information was passed back to a connection of Mr. Duff, a Major Otte, in Kweilin, who was head of a special branch of the 14th Airforce Intelligence which dealt primarily with economic conditions in Free China and occupied areas and not with operational information. During all of this time Mr. Smith in Chungking, as well as the three of us in Kukong, were waiting for some contact or word from the OSS in China or Washington; but during this whole period no word from them had been received. The one exception was the day before Adams and I left Chungking when a naval officer who had come out on the same ship with us from the States dropped around to our hotel, presumably on a social call. He said that he had heard that we were going down to Kwangtung for the relief people and he had brought a friend around, a Commander Reighley (?), who asked us to give him a report on local conditions in that area when we returned to Chungking. He explained that he was with the OSS and that we could contact him through the American Army headquarters when we returned. He was one of Commodore Miles' men and from all indications knew nothing about us. In this regard we had heard about Commodore Miles upon our arrival in Chungking and understood that he was heading the OSS in China, but we made no effort to communicate with him nor did he with us.

Around the end of August, 1943 Mr. Duff and I left Kukong for Toishan and after a two weeks' trip by sanpan and by foot we arrived at our destination. Mr. Duff spent only one week in this area as he received a cable to report back to the United States. He departed for Kweilin and points west with a Reverend Mills, a Canadian missionary of about thirty-five years of age, who headed up the relief situation in the entire Toishan area. I remained and traveled around this southern Kwangtung region for approximately six weeks and in this time I was

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Memo to:  
Major Roger A. Pfaff

5 July 1944

3.

able to get down to the coast and get a good picture of the possibilities of setting up radio and observation stations with which Japanese shipping movements could be detected. I was also in an excellent position to observe local domestic conditions in the entire Sz Yap region, of which Toishan is one of the four districts. One boat trip across a bay along the China coast was made, another was made down to the City of Yeungkong from which wolfram was being shipped out to the Japanese and finally I traveled over to the Ngaimon River which is the borderline between occupied and unoccupied China. From my position on one side of the river I was able to observe the various Japanese fortifications on this boundary line. Around the middle of October I went back to Kweilin, where I turned over my operational intelligence information to Lt. Col. Wilfred Smith of A-2. He was primarily interested in the Japanese fortifications I saw, along with the possibilities of setting up observation stations on the coast.

From Kweilin I went back to Kukong and spent a week with Adams in that city. He had worked out an arrangement with Major Otto whereby he had contacted all of the missionaries in Kwangtung Province who were doing relief work, and Adams sent them regular questionnaires primarily dealing with internal conditions in their local areas. The missionaries were told that Adams was doing this as a favor for the 14th Airforce and that they could be of real service by helping in this regard. Inasmuch as all of them were interested in having increased sums sent to them for relief work and furthermore, inasmuch as Adams as temporary head of the provincial committee was in a position to affirm or disapprove such actions, the missionaries went out of their way to give him detailed answers to these various questions. In turn Adams sent this information on to Major Otto in Kweilin and he was able to send copies to Mr. Smith in Chungking through the British Intelligence office in Kukong. They relayed all his reports to their Chungking office via safe hand and Mr. Smith in Chungking showed them these reports as a return favor for their cooperation in getting this information to him. Unfortunately the missionaries had to use the open mail in sending replies to Adams but Adams was able to forward the information on to Major Otto by safe hand through an arrangement worked out with the local American Army Service of Supply station in Kukong.

(1 left October 20, 1943)

From Kukong I traveled back to Chungking and found the 14th Airforce people very cooperative in supplying me transportation, whereas originally on our trip to Kukong we had just managed to get on a plane to Kweilin. For one thing I believe this new-found hospitality was due to the information both Adams and I were able to give them, and in addition they sounded me out on whether Adams and I would be interested in obtaining commissions in the Airforce Intelligence. In fact Lt. Col. Smith intimated that we would be given captaincies if we would resign from our present outfit and go to Washington on transportation they would obtain for us. How Lt. Col. Smith discovered we were with the OSS I do not know, as, at that time, both Adams and I were very definitely sticking to our story of being insurance men lent out to the United China Relief and being only too anxious to do any odd jobs we could for the local U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to:  
Major Roger A. Pfaff

5 July 1944

12.

Footnotes continued:

- (3) At the time of our departure from the States, in March of 1943, our Insurance Unit was of course under E1. As a consequence, the indoctrination we received was of an E1 nature. Due to lack of communications with Washington, Adams and I did not know that X-2 had become a separate branch until April of 1944 when we met Colonel Rubenstein in Calcutta. Naturally, C. J. Smith was not aware of the change for the same reason.
- (4) With reference to the temporary ranks of the British intelligence in China, I mean that they are only given this rank when they are in China, and if they are transferred back to their regiments in India, they go back one or two ranks to one which corresponds to a rank of any officer in the Army who is not of the permanent Army. In other words, many Britishers who were civilians in the Far East and got out of China, Hongkong, etc. before Pearl Harbor went to India and received direct war-time commissions such as a captaincy. When they were assigned to the British intelligence set-up in China, they were given a "temporary" rank of Major. In other words, General Chenault will presumably not allow anyone to remove his Captain's bars when he goes down country and put on a Major's leaf while traveling in those down country areas.

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Footnotes continued:

- (c) Chinese business men travel in Free China by whatever transportation is available, but they hardly ever are given transportation on an American military plane unless they are working for the U.S. Airforce. Whereas an American soldier can fly from Chungking to Kweilin via Kunming in seven hours, a Chinese civilian traveling by truck and train will reach Kweilin in two or three weeks' time. There is a regular traffic between Free and Occupied China, which is usually slow but is accomplished with a minimum of effort, and if the Chinese civilian is transporting goods, it usually only requires bribing the Chinese military and customs officials in order to get their stuff into or out of Occupied areas. Their means of transportation is usually by foot over the immediate adjoining regions to the boundary line, and in other places by sanpan or bus.
- (2) It is my opinion that foreign civilians are closely observed even in Chungking upon their arrival in China. I have heard a Chinese state the cases of two foreigners in Chungking who he states made derogatory remarks about the Chinese government; yet as far as I know these foreigners never have said anything in public. I do not believe that in the large cities foreigners are necessarily shadowed, but I think a close watch is kept on them at the various so-called foreign hotels where their remarks can be easily overheard what with the flimsiness of the walls. Any foreigner traveling down country has to go through a lot of red tape in order to get out of Chungking, and even then, when permission is given, I believe his itinerary is cabled on to the officials in the various places he has stated he will visit. I do not necessarily think he is shadowed at all times, but I believe a very close check is kept on his movements. In Mr. Adams' and my own case I do not think we were actually shadowed at all times until the last few months, and then Adams was in Kukung most all the time and could be easily observed; and for my part, in Chekiang Province, I did not detect anyone following me on my trips between various places. It was only after I reached and stayed in a certain place for several days that I was being closely observed. As regards the American military, I do not think they are shadowed, but I think a close scrutiny is kept on their movements when they are in out-of-the-way places and are apt to be in a position to see the bad internal conditions of Free China. I also believe that Tai Lee has young, attractive Chinese girls in his organization who make it a point in such places as Chungking to associate with certain American military officers who are in more or less of an intelligence position. I know of two girls who attended all the foreign social functions in Chungking and who were very friendly with the Assistant American Military Attache and Naval Attache respectively.

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insurance offices in Chungking. There is one reason for keeping this office open even though we do no fire or marine business, that is, that we collect life insurance premiums on old policies at this address. So he has some cover and it might be that one other foreigner out there could also carry on under such a cover. However, I do not think that more than one could get away with it, nor do I think that either Adams or I could get by solely as insurance men.

HKJ:GH

Footnotes:

- (1) Except for the run from Chungking to Kunming, there is no commercial air transportation in China. The Army Transportation Corps has planes running on regular flights from Kunming to all sections of Free China where there are air bases.
  - (a) American military personnel are given priority for air transport, which is usually based upon rank - exceptions being made for important missions, health, etc.
  - (b) Foreign civilians are infrequently given permission to ride on military planes and even then are given the worst priority - one that corresponds with that given an enlisted man in the army. There have been intervals when directives were issued barring military plane transportation to any and all civilians, but these have usually been modified, particularly in getting missionaries back to Kunming from forward areas. However, no missionary, or any civilian, unless he is openly connected with the U.S. Government, is given military plane transportation in China and on the rare occasions when such transportation is obtained, one usually is not very certain until the plane takes off from the field that it won't be recalled.

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would like very much to get out of China and his organization. One man told me that Commodore Miles had received various bits of information from Chinese intelligence circles which he knew were absolutely false, yet he passed them on to Washington without any comment or indication that he believed them to be untrue. I also know that Commodore Miles has not cooperated to any extent with the other American intelligence agencies in China and one JICA man told me that in their efforts to get set up in China they were receiving cooperation from every intelligence unit except Commodore Miles'. I do know that Miles definitely resents the OSS personnel in China, and it is interesting to note that those of his men who highly regard him in his efforts have made uncomplimentary remarks about the OSS in my presence. Of course they did not know my true identity.

I also understand that Colonel Jesse Williams, the head of A-2, has not definitely given his full approval to the new AGFRT situation; but the fact that his assistant, Colonel Smith, is being lent to them would indicate that A-2 would actively work into this new set-up. Being in such a unique position, whereby I actually worked for every American intelligence agency on my last trip to Chekiang except for Commodore Miles' outfit, I have been in a position to observe the conflict among these organizations - also the personal jealousies that exist between the heads of these units. Therefore, in my opinion, the best intelligence job and the only real way a unified effort can be made is under this new AGFRT arrangement. It should not only eliminate personal conflicts but should do away with doing overlapping work.

At the present time the AFIA and the AIU have a very nice office in Chungking which is run by a Mr. Richard Shim. He is an Hawaiian-born Chinese, who was manager of the Asia Life in Hongkong and, in my opinion, is a very reliable individual. He is a rare exception in the Chinese in that he admits they have weaknesses and at the same time his viewpoint is very American. Shim has had no intelligence experience but he was able to procure three Chinese for our organization. One of these men did not turn out satisfactorily but the other two made trips to Hongkong and Swatow and were in a position to obtain some excellent information. When Adams contacted Colonel Coughlin, he told Coughlin about these two men and Coughlin consequently contacted Shim in Chungking and worked out an arrangement, the details of which I am not fully aware of. However, these two men, Harry and Ed, have been given radio sets and are presumably now in occupied territory or very close to occupied territory. They send all reports back to Captain Lynn in Kukong, who is connected with A-2, but I believe will be in the new AGFRT set-up. Harry and Ed have also been given various other equipment which can be exceedingly useful in their operations, and I believe they are also supplied with funds which they can give to any agents they obtain. I furthermore believe that Shim will get reports of their work through Colonel Coughlin or direct from Captain Lynn in Kukong. I have not seen Shim since last December and as a result I do not know what other work he is doing. However, I understand that Colonel Coughlin has worked out some arrangement with him and it might be that Shim is in a position to lend active assistance to the OSS office in Chungking. I do believe that Shim could be worthwhile in both operational and X-2 work under the set-up he now has, i.e., manager of our

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personnel in that area. I do think that some X-2 work could also be done at the same time; and certainly if I was to be kept in X-2 work, I could do a better job in China than in India where I know people, have traveled extensively and have contacts in most of the areas in Free China, and where I also know of several suspicious people or cabarets run by girls whom I have heard many stories of as regards their possible connections and what their true aims are at this time. I am referring in this connection primarily to two cabarets in Kweilin named the "Lido" and the "Sky Hawk". They are both run by Chinese girls who used to live in Hongkong and whose pasts are certainly questionable.

As far as operating in China, I believe it would be preferable at this time to operate in the open as I think any cover insofar as Adams or I are concerned would be extremely difficult to maintain. I think too that any pretense of cover would only arouse the suspicions of the Chinese that much more; whereas if we operate in the open, either in a civilian or military capacity, and they are assured that we are not investigating internal conditions in Free China but are working solely against the enemy, they will neither view us with suspicion nor make any effort to obstruct our work. I do think that having a definite military rank is preferable to going back as a civilian inasmuch as that carries more prestige when dealing with the local Chinese military or civil officials. It also would not attract as much attention or questioning on the part of everyone. However, unless suitable rank is obtainable, I believe that these advantages are erased and that it is preferable to go back as a civilian definitely connected with the OSS, with some such anonymous title as "Technical Representative". The British have no rank in their intelligence set-up less than Major in China, which of course is only a temporary rank, but which enables them to deal with the Chinese with more "face" inasmuch as all Chinese are at least Colonels with whom an Allied intelligence man comes into contact. I, furthermore, understand that General Chenault will not allow anyone to have temporary rank even when he is going down past the most forward American base. Speaking for myself, I do not believe that I will have any difficulty in carrying out my duties in China as long as I operate in the open and presumably work for the 14th Airforce - who are recognized by the Chinese as the "big heroes".

Frankly I do not want to go back to China under the same system as before with no definite channels of sending information back or of getting transportation or other facilities needed to do a really worthwhile job. I appreciate that the trouble caused on our last trip whereby we were never able to get anything back to the OSS was due to various reasons, none of which is connected with any individual unless we take Commodore Miles into the picture. In this connection I understand that Commodore Miles knew of our identity when we first arrived in China and that he openly disparaged anything we could do and more or less dismissed us as business men and referred to anything we might do as an amateurish effort. Every indication would point to the fact that he notified Tai Lee of our true connections. I do know that Commodore Miles told his own personnel to stay away from us. But, on the other hand, some of his personnel have told me several things about Commodore Miles and his set-up in China. Many of his people are exceedingly dissatisfied with the work they are doing and

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weeks I was told to report to Colonel Rubenstein in Calcutta.<sup>(3)</sup> Colonel Rubenstein also thought it best for me to return to the States, and wired Washington to that effect. He received a reply, telling both Adams and me to await Mr. Irvine's arrival in Calcutta, which Rubenstein thought would occur very shortly. However, when we finally heard that Irvine had not even left the States, I sent a radio message back through Captain Brown, Colonel Rubenstein's assistant, asking to be relieved of any duty in India or any enforced wait for Irvine's arrival. Receiving no answer to this message I sent a commercial telegram to Mr. C. V. Starr stating that I was unwilling to remain in India any longer; and, as a result of this telegram, I received a message saying that transportation was being arranged. I left Calcutta on June 19, 1944 and arrived at LaGuardia on June 22, 1944.

My reasons for being unwilling to remain in India longer were due to the fact that I was doing practically nothing of a constructive nature in Calcutta and that I knew that Colonel Coughlin and the other intelligence people in China all wanted me to come back there and work in the newly formed joint intelligence unit, AGFRT. Colonel Rubenstein had asked Adams and me both to frequent the various night clubs in Calcutta and attempt to get into various circles including the airforce pilots and the China National Aviation Corporation pilots. He wanted us to attempt to detect any activities of Japanese agents. Inasmuch as both Adams and I were unacquainted with Calcutta and the people there, it took us some time to work ourselves into these circles, and even when we did we were unable to note any possible enemy agents, although we did discover and consequently have discharged one girl who held a responsible position as a secretary to a high American officer. We discovered that she was talking too much, but that was obviously through carelessness and stupidity on her part rather than because of being an enemy employee. Both Adams and I felt that our year in China had given us some experience in operational intelligence and that we were best fitted to serve in that capacity; whereas we had had absolutely no training in counterintelligence work; and that we were hardly "worth our salt" in Calcutta. And at that time it was obvious that Colonel Rubenstein had no organized set-up in Calcutta and everything seemed to be rather at loose ends, which made our position that much more worthless.

In my opinion I can best serve in the Far East in the new associated intelligence agency of AGFRT. This unit will be headed up by Lt. Col. Wilfred Smith, who will be lent to them by A-2. The personnel will be made up of A-2, G-2, ONI, OSS and even people who are normally under Commodore Miles. Colonel Coughlin is working very closely with this organization and he and Colonel Smith seem to get along very well. As a consequence, I think for the first time that the OSS will be able to work in China and actually obtain the full cooperation and approval of the various military intelligence agencies. Both Colonel Coughlin and Colonel Smith seem to think that I would be most valuable down on the Chekiang coast where I would have to my advantage the contacts I originally established there along with the active knowledge and cooperation of the British

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being constantly shadowed and every movement I made was being closely observed. I felt quite sure these people were Tai Lee men and not Japanese agents, and I believe that subsequent events have proved this to be the case.<sup>(2)</sup>

Upon returning to Pihu, the British told me that they had word that my cover had been exposed and that everyone in the local provincial circles knew of my identity although I doubt whether they knew that I was connected with the OSS. They probably thought me a plain-clothes military man. When I returned to Kukong, Adams told me that several things had shown him that the Tai Lee was definitely aware of our true connections. As one example, he recited the case of Mr. Mills, the head of the Toishan relief, who had been asked by Mr. Duff to gather information for us in the Toishan area, had entertained a Chungking banker who was visiting that region. This banker asked Mills, after a dinner party one night, whether he knew of three foreigners named Duff, Smith and Adams who were presumably doing relief work. When Mills replied in the affirmative, the banker said that we were not really relief men but were enemies of the Chinese people and were spies looking into local internal conditions. He ascribed the fact that we were enemies of the Chinese people to the fact that we resented anti-foreign insurance laws that were apt to be put into effect in the near future. Mills, being of a rather emotional nature, immediately wrote the U.C.R., demanding that we be dismissed from their service; but the relief officials in Chungking never did ask Adams and me to dissociate ourselves from their organization. This might be due to the fact that we left China before they could take any such action, although I am not at all sure this is the case. I might add that Mills was never told that we were with the OSS, but when he had journeyed up to Chungking with Mr. Duff last autumn, Duff and Mr. C. J. Smith asked Mills whether he would be interested in helping the local war effort by gathering any information on his return to Toishan and forwarding it up to either Mr. Adams in Kukong or Mr. Smith in Chungking whichever way he could most safely transmit the information. Mr. C. J. Smith gave him 10,000 Chinese dollars to cover any expenses incurred in doing this work.

March 12, 1944,

After seeing Adams in Kukong, I went over to Kunming, where I contacted Colonel Coughlin, who I had heard was the new head of the OSS in China. Adams had contacted Coughlin several months before and had seen him when Coughlin came down to Kukong on a trip. The Colonel, upon hearing the situation as it stood at that time, decided that the best thing possible was for me to return to Washington, get a commission and return to China to carry on intelligence work in the open. He sent a radio message to Washington and I was packed and ready to leave upon a moment's notice. This all took place around March 20, 1944. Although the Colonel sent two radio messages and a letter to Washington, no reply was received for six weeks, during which time I remained in Kunming, as it was thought that it would be inadvisable for me to travel around China any longer under the circumstances that existed then. It was even felt that I should stay out of Chungking, so I did not go back to that city. After six

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Pihu for several days and then proceeded down the Wu River to Wenchow. Here I stayed with two Britishers who were in the British intelligence service and who offered me every possible cooperation. In fact they opened all their files to me and although they understood everything was being passed on by their main office in Calcutta to the 14th Airforce that was of an operational nature, I nevertheless made copies of practically every report they issued, with the result that when, weeks later, I returned to Kuuming, the 14th Airforce found out that the British Calcutta office had not turned over to them much of the information I had been given in Wenchow. Aside from the information the British gave me; I obtained various bits of news regarding Shanghai and shipping movements along the coast from reliable Chinese sources I was able to establish. I also obtained some charts and papers taken from Jap ships that had been sunk by our planes. But for the most part this material had been already procured by the British, who sent it via safe hand direct to Calcutta, with the result that the 14th Airforce obtained very little of the loot taken off these ships sunk by their planes.

I also made a trip out to Yuhwan Island, some eight miles off the Chekiang coast. From a hill on this island I was able to detect Jap ships moving southward and also could see the funnel and upper structure of a ship sunk by our planes some two miles off this island. The people on the island also sold me things they had obtained from this ship that had washed ashore and that they had salvaged. Because of the fact that the Japs would undoubtedly be told of my presence on the island by local fishermen who were in their pay, I was able to spend only two days and a night there. On returning to Wenchow I found that a message awaited me from Adams in Kukong stating that our cover had been blown. The British in Pihu also sent word down that they had information which would make it advisable for me to get back to their place immediately.

On this entire trip I had posed as a relief official, but, inasmuch as the economic conditions in this province were particularly good, I had to change my position somewhat and say that I was up there looking into the plague epidemic that happened to be raging at that time. The local government officials had been exceedingly hospitable to me, which was partially due to my being the first American in their section, and probably due also to the fact that they thought I had large amounts of relief money to dispose of. However, I found myself being so tied down with their showing me around to hospitals and medical stations, along with very extensive entertaining, that it was very hard to find time to look into matters that I was primarily interested in. Therefore, I finally told them that General Chenault had asked me, inasmuch as I was going to be up in that area, to look into several things for him, and that as a consequence I would like to visit the coastal areas. The local officials did not dare to take the responsibility of approving my request so they wired back to Chungking for approval. Realizing that they would undoubtedly get a negative reply, I left Wenchow secretly on my trip to the Island, although upon my arrival there I found the head man expecting me. During this whole time I was

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
military. I imagine Smith identified us through Colonel Jesse Williams, the head of the Airforce Intelligence, who was an ex-Texas Oil Company executive in Shanghai. He evidently knew of our connection when we first arrived in China.

Upon my arrival in Chungking, on November 15, 1943, I discovered that Mr. C. J. Smith had had no word from the OSS as yet but that General Donovan was due to arrive in Chungking in a week's time. This information was given us by Colonel Brown, the Naval Attache in the Embassy, who had been approached by the Messrs. Smith and Duff a month or two before and who promised, upon being told of their connections, that he would get back any reports given him to General Donovan in Washington. An agreement was made whereby Colonel Brown would be able to see these reports and would then get them back to the General. Mr. Smith and I sat quiet when the General arrived in Chungking and some ten days later we learned that he had already departed and that once again we had not been approached by any OSS personnel. Mr. Smith then received a cable from Mr. C. V. Starr to return to New York for a conference, and I decided to go into a territory where, as far as I knew, no American military personnel had been - that was on the Chekiang coast some two hundred miles below Shanghai. I might add at this time that any information that was sent to Mr. Smith by Adams or me was being shown to two agencies, namely, the British Intelligence office in Chungking and the American Naval Attache. Information given to A-2 was done so by Adams and me direct.

I traveled down to Kunming, on December 22, 1943, by CNAC plane inasmuch as the military authorities suddenly tightened up on Army air transportation and were unwilling to cooperate in getting me down country. This might have been caused by my not accepting their offer to take a commission in the Airforce. At Kunming I was told that no civilians could travel on Army planes any longer so it was necessary for me to disclose my identity in order that the Airforce could wire back to Delhi to find out whether civilian OSS personnel were entitled to Army air transportation. Unfortunately, in doing this, several people in G-2 also learned of this situation, and Colonel Dicky, on General Stilwell's staff, was apprised of Adams' and my true identity. Word was finally received from Delhi that it was all right for us to use Army air transportation, and we were consequently given the worst priority for air travel issued in China, with the result that we usually had to wait a long time for plane transportation. From Kunming I flew to Kweilin and then proceeded on to Kukong by train. After a few days' stay in Kukong I traveled, via British military mission truck, up to their camp at Pihu in Chekiang.

Fortunately, General Grimsdale, the head of the British military set-up in China had given me a letter of introduction and with this letter I was able to obtain the full cooperation of the British in such matters as transportation, lodging, etc. The British military mission was interested only in guerrilla training and had an arrangement with the 3rd War Zone in Chekiang similar to Commodore Miles' set-up in Anhui Province. I remained at their camp in

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TRANSLATION

SUPREMA COMMAND  
OFFICIAL INFORMATION

P. M. 151/4 25 April 1944.

My Dear Colonel:

Thank you very much for the kind remarks sent to this Office in appreciation of our work up to the present time.

May I, moreover, take this opportunity to assure you that everything possible will always be done to develop and maintain more efficient collaboration between our Office and the corresponding Allied organizations.

In the hope of seeing you soon, please accept my best regards.

(signed) Lt. Col. Rivetis

Col. C. C. Carter,  
Commanding Officer  
Office of Strategic Services  
Allied Armies in Italy - U.S. Army

TRANSLATION

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(Signed) Col. P. Agrifoglio

Col C. C. Carter,  
Commanding Officer,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Allied Armies in Italy - U.S. Army

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY  
APO 777, U.S. ARMY

17 April 1944

My Dear Colonel Pompeo Agrifoglio:

On behalf of General W. J. Donovan and Colonel E. J. Glavin, Commanding, Office of Strategic Services in North Africa, I wish to express sincere thanks for your most gracious cooperation in assisting us to further the War effort.

You may rest assured that we appreciate your most kind gift of your two personal Beretta pistols.

I am looking forward to thanking you personally, sometime in the near future.

Sincerely,

C. C. CARTER,  
Colonel, C.A.C.  
Commanding.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY  
APO 777, U.S. ARMY

17 April 1944

My Dear Lt. Colonel Mario Revetria:

On behalf of General W. J. Donovan and Colonel E. J. Glavin, Commanding, Office of Strategic Services in North Africa, I wish to express sincere thanks for your most gracious cooperation in assisting us to further the War effort.

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Sincerely,

O. O. CARTER,  
Colonel, C.A.G.  
Commanding.

SECRET.

HQ SOM,  
CMF.

REF: SO/158

16th May, 1944.

Dear Carter.

Reference your letter of 4th May regarding parachute training for personnel of our respective organizations.

The situation is that, at present, there are two or three parachute schools in Italy catering for the needs of both regular troops and ourselves. The personnel of the R.A.F. parachute school, formerly at RAMET DAVID, are going spare and in order to utilize the services of the skilled personnel of this school, MAAF have decided to set up one central parachute school to cater for the needs of all organizations in Italy. I was asked whether I would subscribe to this idea. So far as we were concerned I agreed to do so because it seemed logical and economical to cut out any unnecessary overheads which separate establishments involve. Further I had experience of the training given by the RAMET DAVID school. I stipulated, however, that our special needs should be safeguarded and laid down what our special requirements as regards security, special training, etc., are. MAAF have agreed to provide all the facilities now available at No. 1 Special Force School.

I have agreed that No. 1 Special Force should keep their school in being until we are satisfied that the facilities provided by the new Central School do, in fact, meet our needs.

I am very grateful to you for the kind remarks of appreciation you were good enough to make regarding the cooperation and training provided by No. 1 Special Force parachute school.

I apologise for not answering your letter before this but I had hoped to see you yesterday and explain the whole situation to you in detail verbally.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Comd. HOLDSWORTH.

Yours sincerely

/s/ W. Stawell

Col C.C. CARTER,  
C.A.C.,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Allied Armies in Italy,  
APO 777, U.S. Army.



3. The following personnel could not attend:

Maj. Ball - working.  
Maj. Terrielli - T/D, Bari.  
Maj. Koch - T/D, Bari.

4. Purpose of the dinner, to establish better relations with State Department, U. S. Army, and Italian Army. There were no speeches. Party was a success.

C. G. CARTER  
Colonel, C.A.C.  
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - ITALY  
APO 777, U.S. ARMY

11 May 1944

SUBJECT: Official Dinner.

TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Headquarters Company, OSS,  
(Prov.), APO 512, U. S. Army.

1. On Tuesday, 9 May, I gave an official dinner at Villa Maria.
2. The following guests were present:

STATE DEPARTMENT

Ambassador Alexander Kirk  
Mr. Horn  
Mr. Livengood  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Goshi  
Mr. Reinhardt  
Mr. Reber

U. S. ARMY

General Lemnitzer  
Col. Smith  
Major McBe

ITALIAN ARMY

General Infante  
General Rosi  
Col. Agrifoglio  
Col. Revetria  
Col. De Francesco

OSS

Col. Goodfellow  
Col. Huntington  
Col. Carter  
Col. Nee  
Maj. Waffle  
Maj. Berding  
Maj. Angleton

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - ITALY  
APO 777 U. S. ARMY

12 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Badoglio Visit.

TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Hq Co OSS (Prov), APO 512, U. S. Army.

1. On Wednesday, a party consisting of Colonel Goodfellow, Colonel Huntington, Colonel Carter, Major Angleton and Colonel Revetria (Italian Army), visited Marshal Badoglio at Salerno.

2. The party spent an hour with the Marshal with Mr. Franco Montinari acting as interpreter. The subject of the conversation was Italy's status at the present time and future possibilities under the plan he has for the new government. This plan was briefed to you by Mr. Scamporino and I do not think I should put it in writing at this time due to security. I was also briefed by Mr. Scamporino and he did a very good job of it. In fact he even used the Marshal's exact words and phrases at times. Nothing new was brought out at the conference and the Marshal repeated his desire to have Italy help the Allies in every way possible. The visit was very interesting and the Marshal has an extraordinary personality.

3. After the visit with the Marshal, we had lunch with Marshal Messe, Commanding the Land, Sea and Air Forces of Italy. He explained that Italy was anxious to help and told us that there were 14,000 troops ready to go into action at any time. He desires help from our Air Force. The rest of the conversation was purely personal, renewing old friendships.

4. No commitments or expression of opinion were made by any member of the American party.

C. C. CARTER  
Colonel, C. A. C.  
Commanding.

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General, Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater, Bari; OSS ACC; and such additional army and other headquarters which will permit exercise of responsibility and authority for OSS activities.

7. Communications activities will be coordinated by OSS Algiers in compliance with current orders from AGHQ Chief Signal Officer as transmitted through Communications Officer or his representative.

8. An officer in charge of OSS activities for the Naples area will be appointed by you not later than April 15th to represent your headquarters.

9. All personnel now on duty with OSS Bari will be transferred from the Cairo T/O to the Algiers T/O for re-assignment with your headquarters.

10. Special attention is invited to current procedure for the preparation of weekly reports to this headquarters which will be continued on schedule.

EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS  
2677th HEADQUARTERS COMPANY OSS (PROVISIONAL)  
APO 512  
U.S. ARMY

11 April 1944

TO: Colonel C. C. Carter

SUBJECT: Orders


1. In compliance with verbal orders from the Director of OSS, confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, information copies forwarded to the Theater Commander and Deputy Theater Commander, you are hereby designated as Commanding Officer of OSS Italy. You will assume command of all OSS activities in Italy to include the following:
  - a. OSS activities with the 5th and 8th Armies which, for these purposes, will operate under OSS-AAI.
  - b. OSS Bari which, for these purposes, is released from all control of OSS Cairo.
  - c. OSS activities from Corsica which are directed into or from Italy.
  - d. All OSS-SI, MO, R & A, X-2, and other activities, Mr. Vincent Scamporino is hereby designated officer in charge of all Italian SI. All Italian MO shall be controlled by an officer of your selection working in conjunction with Mr. Eugene Warner, Chief MO, for the Mediterranean Theater.
2. These instructions will be coordinated with the Commanding General, AAI, and with Major General Stawell, Commanding General, Special Ops, Mediterranean Theater, headquarters, Bari, Italy.
3. You will initiate the following transfers of personnel to Algiers on or about April 20th: Lt. Callanan, Lt. Barnes, and Lt. Buserak.
4. The following personnel are designated as members of your staff:
  - a. Lt. Colonel Nee, Executive Officer
  - b. Major Torielli, Intelligence Officer
  - c. Major Koch, Operations Officer
  - d. Lt. Hubbell, or Lt. Brown, Communications Officer
  - e. Captain Echols, Services Officer
5. The final date of the above assignments are dependent upon independent releases which will be the subject of further cabled instructions.
6. You are hereby directed to complete current arrangements in respect to liaison with the advanced echelon of Special Ops Sub-Section, G-3, AFHQ, Caserta; Special Operations Section AAI; Headquarters Commanding

- 4 -

**SECRET**

personal contact with General Devers, General Lemnitzer, Ambassador Kirk, and Marshall Bagdolio, then Acting Chief of the Provisional Government.

14. Any of the above items will be expanded at any length if so desired.



C. C. CARTER  
Colonel, CAC  
Commanding

**SECRET**

SECRET

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Headquarters of OSS in Rome. On 11 June Colonel Glavin inspected Villa Torlonia and accepted it for OSS.

8. On my arrival in Rome I reported by messenger my presence in Rome to General Lemnitzer, AAI. On 12 June I personally visited General Lemnitzer and received from him the information that Headquarters AAI Main would physically move into Rome about June 20. During the period 8 June to 18 June there were numerous administrative difficulties. I personally had to inspect and supervise the requisitioning of all properties. I personally had to make arrangements for rationing of my personnel, in addition to carrying out the usual duties of a Commanding Officer in regard to intelligence and operations. The communications facilities were practically nil. I had one radio set, with two very poor operators. I made arrangements to use the Army teletype and telegraph, which was part of the Rome Area Command. This resulted in a normal delay of 6 to 8 hours to get messages from Rome to San Leucio to be retransmitted. I had to use motor courier in order to contact AAI Advanced.

9. On 26 June General Donovan and party arrived in Rome at 1145. At 1420 General Donovan left Rome to visit General Clark. On 27 June General Donovan had an audience with the Pope at 0930. (Note: This audience was secured by my staff within 48 hours, which is an all time Vatican record. The Pope usually requires 2 weeks to 2 months to make arrangements for an audience.) At 1115 General Donovan left for Bari.

10. On 3 July Colonel Glavin arrived in Rome and ordered me verbally to proceed to Algiers and then to Washington. The original order of 29 June from General Donovan to Colonel Carter was finally received by me in Algiers on 8 July. I proceeded to Washington and arrived on 13 July.

11. During the period April 11 to 6 July I received no clerical help for OSS Italy. I had one Services officer for OSS Italy, and this officer was not assigned to me until six weeks after I took command. During the entire period we were badly handicapped by lack of communications and transportation. The above facts were brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer, OSS, Mediterranean, on every semi-monthly report and, in addition, in special requests which averaged about once a week.

12. Reports of OSS-Italy were extracted in Algiers and forwarded to Washington, but the complete reports were not forwarded to OSS Washington. This includes letters of commendation which were received by OSS-Italy on numerous occasions.

13. When I left Italy relations between OSS-Italy and the American and British government agencies had improved to such an extent that we were receiving letters of commendation and had been given a status practically equal to ACC, AIG, and other agencies in the theatre. Our dealings were on the very highest level, with

SECRET

- 2 -

**SECRET**

4. About May 1 all agent activity was stopped by the British due to their having picked up Princeps Pignatelli. Several conferences were held on this matter, and after a period of nearly a month we were allowed to send agents through the lines with the agreement that X-2 would check all agents and state to the British that the agents had been thoroughly checked. About the 20th of April I ordered an investigation of all activities of all agent chains in Italy. The investigating board was composed of Colonel G. C. Carter, Lt Col Nee, Major Torrielli, Major Keoh, Lt Callanan, recorder without vote. Lt Callanan was placed on this board because he was the only person assigned or attached to OSS-Italy who could take shorthand. These investigations were proceeding and we had just gotten to the investigation of Italian SI when Colonel Goodfellow's board arrived. In talking with Colonel Goodfellow I found that we would be duplicating our efforts if I conducted a similar investigation, so it was agreed that Major James H. Angleton of my staff would be appointed and would sit as a member of the board during the investigation of personnel of SI-Italy. Major Angleton reported to me on each case and received my approval for the action recommended. The complete proceedings of this board have been transmitted to the Director, OSS.

5. During the month of May I spent most of my time making contacts with various government officials in Italy, both British and American, in order to have OSS-Italy given its proper place in the general organization. I personally had the best of relations with the American and British staffs, and as a result OSS-Italy was completely recognized by all agencies.

6. On May 22, as a result of the investigations that I was trying to conduct on Italian SI, I had a meeting called in Algiers which resulted in a board being appointed by Colonel Glavin to investigate Italian SI. This board consisted of Colonel Glavin, ex officio, Colonel Carter, Colonel Early, Major Torrielli, Major Chapin, and Mr. Scamporrino, and was to meet at a later date at San Leucio. On May 28 Colonel Glavin and Major Chapin arrived at San Leucio and spent until June 4 going over records and making notes. On June 3 a meeting was held on Italian SI and orders were issued reference chain of command and channels of communication. On June 4 Colonel Glavin left for Bari.

7. On June 6 I got a report that OSS was running wild in Rome. I immediately tried to get permission to go to Rome and assume command of the Forward Echelon. I was unsuccessful until the night of June 7, when I received permission personally from General Lemnitzer to proceed to Rome. General Lemnitzer had been absent from Headquarters AAI on the 6th and 7th. Early the morning of 8 June I proceeded to Rome and assumed command of the Forward Echelon of OSS-Italy. I immediately issued orders as to the proper method of requisitioning office space, living quarters, and transportation. I was determined that there would be no repetition of what had happened when OSS moved into the Naples area some months previously. I immediately called on Major General H. H. Johnson, Commanding General of the Rome Area Command, and established our relationship with him. On the 9th of June Villa Torlonia was inspected and deemed suitable for the

**SECRET**



HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL GROUPS  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1- 909-  
**SECRET**  
*Field Report*  
*X Conference*

31 July 1944

SUBJECT: Overseas Report  
TO: Director, OSS  
THRU: Deputy Director, SSO

1. On April 11, 1944 I received orders from Colonel Glavin to proceed to Italy and assume command of OSS-Italy (copy of orders attached). On arrival at Caserta I immediately assumed command of OSS Allied Armies in Italy. On April 12 I activated and organized OSS-Italy, which consisted of OSS-AAI, OSS-Bari, Italian SI, and activities from Corsica into or from Italy. On April 14 I was notified by telephone that there was a riot of our SI and SO agents in Brindisi. I telephoned Commander Green to proceed to Brindisi, make an investigation, and assume command until my arrival. On April 15 I proceeded to Bari and explained to Lt Cmdr Green the new organization of OSS-Italy, inspected the Headquarters, paid my respects to General Twining and General Born, 15th Air Force, held a conference with JICA reference suitable targets for San Marco Battalion.

2. On April 16 I proceeded to Brindisi and investigated the conditions there and the cause of the riot. In Brindisi I found conditions very bad. There was no security, and there were 14 agents lodged in two rooms in the middle of town. These agents had been there as much as three weeks, and most of them had completely blown their cover. I found that Lt Cordell, the CO in Brindisi, was extremely ill, and ordered his hospitalization. Lt Cordell, with the aid of one Cpl and with a jeep that he had borrowed from a friend of his in the 12th Air Force, had been trying to handle all operational activities in the Brindisi area. Lt Cordell had done a superior job under a difficult situation, having no directives and no chain of command to turn to for help. Through his own personal efforts and friends he conducted to the best of his ability all operations out of Brindisi. I immediately ordered 5 officers into Brindisi area to handle operational activities.

3. During the period April 17 to 28 I was paying official calls on General Sir Maitland Wilson, General Lemnitzer, and the staff members of AAI. I also contacted Ambassador Kirk, General McFarlane, of AGC, General Dammel, Commanding Naples Area, and visited Forward Echelons of the 5th and 8th Armies. During this period I had numerous administrative difficulties, so I requested a conference with Colonel Glavin and staff in Algiers. This conference was held on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of April, at which time Commander Green was present. It appeared at that time that all parties concerned understood the new organization of OSS-Italy.

**SECRET**

Form 2202

SECRET

14,909 104

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Field report

X Confidential

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd BA ....

2173 2nd

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Filed		
Col. Bigelow		1 Aug		gun	Please Return to Secretariat Papark Office SL  To Registry W B K
General Donovan				SL	

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20840)

SECRET



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive Officer, SI

FROM : William L. Brewster, Captain *WLB*

DATE: 2 August 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

- 2 -

Personnel to go into Northern Italy to establish contact with Italian and German railroad workers was recruited and trained, but the mission was never dispatched as the operations officer would not give it sufficient priority for transportation.

During this period, Labor personnel for use in Germany, Austria and France were trained and qualified in parachuting and three excellent radio operators were developed.

Two men were introduced into German POW stockades and lived with the prisoners as prisoners for two weeks, thereby gaining excellent training and valuable information.

c During this period the particular condition that could have been improved was a lack of staff personnel. However, I believe this situation has now been remedied, and when I left it was my feeling that matters were progressing extremely well. Central European personnel is now in Bari, some should be in the field shortly. French personnel remain in Algiers under the direction of John Clark who seemed to me to be extremely capable of handling the situation there.

d There are no specific difficulties in the field, but I have a feeling that too much development was being done on top and too little on the bottom. To my mind the important point to be strengthened is the desk head. Coordination, liaison and contact work are of no use unless at the production level intelligence is being brought in. In the Algiers office it would seem to me that it was unnecessary to have both an SI Officer and staff, and an Intelligence Officer and staff. I can understand from a Commanding Officer's point of view that he would wish to have a man who was responsible for the intelligence work instead of having all the various branches coming directly to him. However, it seemed to me that each desk should be directly under the intelligence officer as their problems and modes of operation are quite independent, and matters that are not independent I believe can be dealt with satisfactorily on the basis of liaison between the desks rather than control over them. This of course is merely a personal opinion applying only to the office where I have been, as no doubt conditions are different in other offices.

WLB/gil

SECRET

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Field Report 15,021

TO : Mr. [illegible]  
 FROM : William L. Drew  
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

DATE: 2 August 1944

a I have just returned from six months duty with the Labor Desk in Algiers, where I was originally sent to do administrative office work. Due to the fact that certain staff personnel was sent into the field, certain were recalled to Washington, one officer transferred out to Communications, and furthermore, that the head of the desk was absent from Algiers for at least three quarters of the time, it became necessary to attend to all the various aspects of running the desk such as messing, billeting, obtaining rations, housing, training, as well as the administrative and policy functions necessary at the headquarters.

Besides the regular Labor Desk functions, this desk through some historical process, had become responsible for all Central European work that was done at the Headquarters, not only in AI lines but also R & A and CD with minor aid from time to time to the Reporting Board and MO.

b The research personnel produced weekly a bulletin covering developments in Germany obtained from current German newspapers and known as the Wochenbericht. This function, together with the personnel connected with it, has recently been turned over to R & A.

A large collection of German documents was collected and classified and this function has recently been turned over to CD branch together with one man recruited by this desk.

Documents and stamps collected by this section were used by MO in the beginning of their activities, and recently one man recruited by this desk has been transferred to MO for their use.

The Sparrow mission was dispatched in March, but unfortunately the enemy moved into the territory involved the day after this party was dropped and the mission has been unsuccessful.

The Quail mission was recruited and trained to set up chains to penetrate Central European countries through labor contacts. However, at a critical moment in the preparation of this project, it became necessary to recall the Naval officer who had been handling the personnel, and the resultant disruption of morale made it necessary to transfer this project to the London office.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : Mortimer B. Wolf

DATE: 9 August 1944

SUBJECT: Comments on Attached Report by Captain Brewster

15,021  
Field report  
**SECRET**

At the request of Lieutenant Beale, the following comments are made concerning the attached report by Captain Brewster based upon his six-months' tour of duty with the Labor Desk, Algiers.

1. The prolonged absence of the head of the desk from Algiers, noted by Captain Brewster, has now been remedied. Lieutenant Devce has been sent to Cairo as desk head there and it is no longer necessary for Mr. Kollender to divide his time between Algiers and Cairo. There will be continued occasion, of course, for trips to Bari by Mr. Kollender. However, since the principal activities of the Labor Desk have now been transferred from Algiers to Bari, these trips should not be regarded as absences from the principal office.
2. The shortage of administrative personnel, noted by Captain Brewster, has now been remedied. The administrative staff in the Algiers-Bari setup consists of Mr. Kollender, Mr. Mosk, Lieutenant Perry, and Mr. Clark. This staff is thought to be adequate for administrative purposes.
3. During the time Captain Brewster was in NATO, the following projects of the Labor Desk were in an active status: Fant A, Fern, Ferro, Heine, Lemon, Quail, Redbird, Rook, Sparrow, Stork, Tunic, Weapons. Captain Brewster's report does not, of course, attempt to go into the details concerning each of these projects, but merely mentions those factors which are regarded by him as the principal developments during his tour of duty.

MBW:GS

*MBW*  
MBW



2202

C A T

Field Report 15021

FROM:

RO:

BY:

SERIAL NO.:

DATE: 10/11/54

RE:

To	Room No.	Initials	Comments
1. Chief, ST		<i>WJ</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. Gen. Donovan		<i>glo</i>	
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

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b

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**SECRET**

Washington already. Whatever may be the need in Washington, it is difficult to realize in the field, where men are doing more dangerous jobs every day, the need for this practice.

*Turner H. McBaine*

Turner H. McBaine  
Lt. Cmdr., USNR

*Read: Mr. Kypson.  
11 Aug. 1944*

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**SECRET**

was later taken over by the Reports Section, and assigned to a specific officer as a full time job.

IV. Conditions in the Field which Might be Improved

It is now almost three months since I left Cairo and, accordingly, while there are many general problems as to which improvements might be made, I have sufficient knowledge in detail only as to the following three in Cairo today:

A. Those remaining in Cairo are afraid that OSS, Middle East, will be stripped of personnel (e.g. Communications personnel) to the point where they cannot even carry on existing operations. While there would not seem much creative work left to do from the Middle East it is felt by all concerned there that the present going organization should not be destroyed by taking out too many HQ personnel. Washington must be the best judge as to whether this is sound policy.

B. There is some doubt in the minds of the Chief of SI and in my mind as to the advisability and usefulness of a Labor Section in OSS, Middle East. This desk cuts across the geographic lines followed by other sections, and there do not seem enough valuable labor contacts in the Middle East to make this worth while.

C. There is decided and unanimous opposition to the payment of extra compensation to enlisted men or officers in the United States armed services. This is invariably arranged in Washington and has been the subject of correspondence between OSS, Middle East and

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Africa 101 made no contribution whatever, positive or negative, to OSS, Middle East; and in fact we did not even know what they were doing except that they worked with Algiers.

I. Reports Office

On my arrival in Egypt in April 1943 as the only representative of the SI branch, I had personally to handle the work of the Reports Office, which even then required the processing and forwarding of a thousand or so British reports a month. This work alone kept my nose to the grindstone until Mr. Penrose and later Ensign Campbell relieved me of a good part of it. Eventually a Reports Officer arrived, by which time I had secured adequate clerical staff on loan from the 9th Air Force. The section finally reached four officers, two editorial assistants, and a half a dozen typists; and it edited, re-produced, circulated, and distributed around 2,500 reports a month. The Reports Office worked under written directives from the Chief Intelligence Officer and Chief, SI as to handling, distribution to certain customers, etc. and under these directives assumed a large degree of responsibility for carrying out reportorial work. As stated above, it acted as a service organization for all personnel, branches and sections of the OSS, Middle East, in handling and providing intelligence.

At first I exercised supervision over the central current intelligence files available for the entire organization; this duty

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**SECRET**

#### G. Czech-Hungarian Section

Following the establishment of a path of entrance through Yugoslavia, efforts were made to organize a Czech-Hungarian Section for the penetration of these two countries. Contact had been established for some time with Colonel Stoj, then acting as Czech military representative in Teheran, and formerly head of all Czech Military Intelligence in Europe. It was hoped to obtain the services of this highly competent intelligence officer as advisor to one or more Americans to head the section. Arrangements were made with Washington to secure the services of Messrs. Jakes and Lienau, and efforts were made to secure from the Czech Government the assignment of Colonel Stoj for the Section. Unfortunately British SIS secured Colonel Stoj's assignment to themselves, beginning their efforts to do so, I am convinced, only after they learned we were interested in him. Since Colonel Stoj was expected to provide recruits for the work, failure to secure his assignment set our plans back immeasurably.

#### H. Africa 101

Representatives of Africa 101 completed their installation in the Middle East during the fall of 1943. Only one request was ever made of them: to inform us of the location of the radio station "Voice of Free Yugoslavia" over which Marshal Tito's communiques were broadcast, and up to the time of my departure from the Middle East they had been unable, or professed to be unable, to establish this location.

**SECRET**

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that these were very productive of intelligence. The Labor Section undertook two specific projects: first, the sending of an Egyptian labor union man throughout the Middle East; and, secondly, the recruiting of a team through the Greek Seamen's Union to send into Greece. So far as I know the Egyptian labor union man may have done excellent work for Labor but did not produce any intelligence for OSS. The second project presented two problems: first, the labor representative as a left winger was sent to contact E.A.M., the internal Greek left wing organization. As the principal resistance group in Greece, this was of far too much importance to be entrusted to the Labor Section alone, which admittedly had no special qualifications or knowledge regarding Greece or Greek politics. Accordingly, direction of this project more or less had to be taken over by the Greek Section of SI with whom the Labor Section worked in commendable harmony; second, the identification of labor groups with left wing political movements which when each of the three principal Balkan countries concerning us were engaged in civil war rendered the OSS policy of no politics difficult. For example, the leaders of the Greek Seamen's Union with whom the Labor Section was working regarding Greece were intimately and publicly involved in the mutiny among the Greek forces in Egypt as a result of which trials and executions are still taking place.

The conclusion remains, therefore, that the Labor Section should probably be limited to liaison work, and except in extraordinary circumstances should not attempt to send agents into the field.

**SECRET**

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most of the Middle East countries, the work was largely one of establishing lines of communication into Cairo, integrating and directing our efforts, and processing and handling our reports. Mr. Stephen Penrose soon arrived from Washington and took over the partial direction of this work, devoting the remainder of his time to the handling of reports. Mr. Penrose was eventually freed to devote his full time to the Section. Mr. Lewis Leary arrived to add to the staff. New agents were sent from Washington and recruited in the field. Eventually a complete coverage of all the Middle East countries was obtained and organized into a working net. Colonel Guenther and Mr. Penrose made trips throughout the Near East in this connection and during the Spring of 1944 I made another such trip.

**E. African Section**

Following the incorporation of all of Africa except Northwest Africa into the American Middle East Command, a representative of the African Section has been stationed in Cairo. He is there solely to provide a link in the chain of command from the Commanding General, USAFIME, and no attempt has been made to really direct the work of the African Section from Cairo.

**F. Labor Section**

The Labor Section was established with the arrival of Mr. Kollender in November 1943. Mr. Kollender undertook to establish contact with labor groups in the Middle East, but it cannot be said

**SECRET**

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first successful group of Yugoslav recruits were secured as a result of the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Mocarski, then assigned to SO. Upon the establishment of our base at Bari, Italy, relations were established with the Yugoslav Partisans under Marshal Tito, and Yugoslav Partisans as well as American officers were trained and sent into Partisan territory. Meanwhile work with the Royal Yugoslavs continued in Cairo, the purpose being to work with one group in one place and the other in the other place.

The placing of American officers in Yugoslavia for SI precipitated a prolonged controversy with British SOE over the right to independent status and communications, and only after considerable negotiation was this right established. Accordingly the work of SI in Yugoslavia was slowed down immeasurably, in contrast to SO work carried out under British Command.

Following the transfer of supreme command for the entire Mediterranean to Algiers the Yugoslav and Albanian Sections were transferred in total to Bari which in turn was directed to report to Algiers.

D. Near East Section

On arrival in the Middle East I contacted Mr. Archie Crawford of the American University in Beirut and on recommendation of OSS, Washington, employed him for the Near East Section, SI, OSS, Middle East. Since OSS representatives were already well placed throughout



**SECRET**

- 4 -

OSS. The result today is a widespread, competent, secure network throughout German-occupied Greece, reporting intelligence of first quality and importance.

B. Albanian Section

The Albanian Section had only one representative in the Middle East until the time of the Allied invasion of Italy. Since recruits were impossible to obtain in the Middle East and none were forthcoming from Washington, no real work could be done until we moved into Italy. With the establishment of the Bari base, a large number of recruits were obtained mostly through the good offices of an SO representative, Mr. Larry Post, with whom I personally worked in recruiting. In order to achieve some results as soon as possible, Mr. Dale MacAdoo was sent into the field and Mr. Harry Fultz took over the Section. Eventually, Albanian recruits who had completed their training were sent to Albania through the point of entry created by Mr. MacAdoo and a fairly adequate intelligence net was created.

C. Yugoslav Section

The work of the Yugoslav Section was somewhat slow in getting started since the first officer specially qualified and assigned to this section did not arrive in the Middle East until September 1943. Meanwhile, I had established liaison with the Royal Yugoslav authorities in Cairo and myself attempted to recruit and train Yugoslav agents but without much success because of language difficulties. The

- 3 -

**SECRET**

### III. Progress and Achievements of SI

#### A. Greek Section

The Greek Section of SI was perhaps the only one arriving in the field with anything like adequate manpower to do its job. The work of establishing relations with Greek authorities and recruiting Greek agents was begun by me even before Mr. Young's arrival. This was possible not because of my expert qualifications but only because the Greeks were willing and anxious to work with an American organization. Being faced immediately with the problem of transporting agents into Greece, SI undertook the creation of a caique service through the Aegean. This involved prolonged efforts to effect clearance with the controlling British Naval Authorities, obtaining and fitting out of the necessary caiques, and the establishment of bases along the way from which they can operate. Some of the latter necessitated negotiations with foreign powers carried out by OS., Istanbul. The establishment and manning of the bases was actually done by SI personnel. As a result there is today an effective caique service, now operated by MU, which not only transports bodies into Greece but brings out a vast amount of intelligence material. The work of the Greek Section has been carried out almost entirely with Greek agent personnel. Two important points should be pointed out: (a) almost every one of these agents is in cities or territories actually held by the Germans, and (b) because they have been transported by our own caique service their identity, destination, etc. is not definitely known to anyone outside

- 2 -

**SECRET**

first part of 1944 and the Intelligence Branch became complete. As Chief Intelligence Officer I undertook the duty of supervising the creation and expansion of the work of the above three branches, presiding over weekly staff meetings with the Chiefs of the Branches, supervising their relations with other OSS activities and with outside contacts, and serving as a connecting link between the branches and the Chief, OSS, Middle East.

The Intelligence Branch functioned smoothly not only within itself, but with the remainder of the organization. Branch rivalries were reduced to a minimum, but coordination with Washington branch chiefs and sections maintained. Care was taken to keep clear the line of demarcation between R&A and SI activities, and between X-2 and Security activities. Every effort was made to see that the three branches concerned did their utmost to service the other activities of OSS. The Reporting Board, for example, by a directive of the Chief, OSS, Middle East, received, processed, circulated, and distributed intelligence reports from all branches and sources, SI, SO, MU, etc. Current intelligence files and a background information library were established and maintained for the use of all OSS personnel. Every attempt was made to give full cooperation to other branches in every way possible, e.g., in the use of SI agents to spread MO rumors. It is felt that the Intelligence Branch achieved, as has been said, not only complete internal harmony, but efficient performance as a part of a larger working organization.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI and Director, OSS  
 FROM : Lt. Cmdr. T. H. McBaine, USNR  
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Activities

DATE: 3 August 1944

15,030  
Full Rep  
**SECRET**I. What the Reporter Actually has been Doing

From approximately June 1943 to the end of May 1944 I was Chief Intelligence Officer, OSS, Middle East. From the latter part of September 1943 through December 1943 I was in Italy, most of the time in command of our advance base at Bari, Italy. From the beginning of June 1944 until my return to Washington on 21 July 1944 I was engaged in a tour of SEAC and CBI on General Donovan's orders. A separate report has been rendered of this trip.

II. Progress and Achievements of the Intelligence Branch, OSS, Middle East

The Intelligence Branch, OSS, Middle East, took form as such upon my appointment as Intelligence Officer in June 1943. At that time there were two R&A representatives assigned to OSS, Middle East, Captain McCullough and Mr. Schewel. SI was represented by Mr. Penrose and Mr. Young and several Greek Section officers. During the course of the next few months R&A grew to a total of approximately nine personnel, while SI expanded by the filling out of the Near East and Greek Sections, and the creation of the Yugoslav, Albanian, and African Sections and a Reporting Board which eventually totaled in itself approximately ten personnel. An X-2 representative arrived during the

10030  
Field Report  
**SECRET**

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

154030  
11111 10001  
X McBaine, A. Comdr  
Turner H.  
X METO

12 August 1944.

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: "Report of Field Com: tions" submitted  
by Lt. Comdr. Turner H. McBaine

Attached herewith is copy of Commander McBaine's  
report covering his tour of duty in the Middle Theater.  
Commander McBaine's recommendations have been noted and  
appropriate action will be taken.  
By direction

Attachment

W. T. M. Beale  
W. T. M. Beale  
Lt., USNR

166 f 812


SECRET

15,030  
Cmdr. McBaine's Report of Field  
Conditions in METO *Field Report*

Distribution - 25 Sep 44

**SECRET**

- 1 IS: Col. Sands
- 2 SSO: Col. Bigelow
- 3 R&A: Dr. Langer
- 4 X-2: Maj. Pfaff
- 5 Secretariat
- 6 Capt. Kantaack






Page 8

Recommendations Continued:-

**SECRET**

7. That for the sake of morale, the end results of information supplied, be transmitted to the informers. (Commensurate with security)

Respectfully Submitted,  
August tenth, 1944.

A handwritten signature, possibly "Spauld", is written over a horizontal line.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

Page 7

**SECRET**

The accommodations given our group of three, was on a similar scale. In comparison, several U.N.R.R.A. Civilians had traveled by sleeper to the Port and had been assigned single cabin reservations. we traveled eight to a cabin.

COMMENTS:-

No criticism of Ty is intended. I realize that he is working under a severe handicap. It seems unfortunate, however that greater use could not have been made of my ability to travel and to contact people in all walks of life. My cover was good for as long as I wanted it; if need be, I could have taken a position with the Swedish Government. I was well established under my cover and did not expect protection from the Minister nor need it. I am certain that I could return to Sweden at any time by invitation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I respectfully suggest:-

1. That no one be sent to Sweden without Ty's request and approval.
2. That all personnel be given a State Department Status.
3. That an XE Department be formed in Stockholm.
4. That the security in the London Embassy and Stockholm Legation be improved.
5. That an officer with knowledge of transportation and the ability and guts to get it be assigned to that duty in London.
6. That a Medical Adviser be appointed to the Legation in Stockholm.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

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**SECRET**

that it was impossible to secure Air priority or transport. It was finally announced that fast boat accommodations had been secured by using great influence. Having seen a great many civilians from other departments leave by Air, I investigated and was informed that all that was needed was a request for Air priority from our department. This was to be transmitted via a Mr. Boerum at the Embassy. Mr. Boerum had no authority, but was in the nature of liaison officer with responsible departments. I was further informed that a three priority would be granted me immediately upon receipt of a request, that there was no shortage of Air transport. Specifically, on Friday the 21st of July, there were at Preswick, two one's and seventeen two's, less than a Plane load. That if I reached Preswick, I would be flown out in two or three days, weather permitting. That this situation had prevailed for approximately a month. On the 21st, a request for Air transportation was forwarded to Mr. Boerum. On the 22nd, he informed our office that it was impossible to say when I would be granted a priority. This, in spite of the fact that the request was awaited and a three priority available to me. Obviously, Mr. Boerum was holding up the application. Why the lack of co-operation with our department?

On the 24th, I left London to get to a ship. Day coach reservations had been made; the train on which I left was running an added section to the 9:15 P.M., which carried the sleepers. A previous train, carrying the sleepers left at 8:40 P.M. for the same destination. The passengers traveling by day coach consisted of discharged civilian employees of an American Contracting Firm, or employees who were tired of their job and wanted to go home. There were also some English wives of American Soldiers.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

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It took me two weeks to secure an appointment to meet the Minister. The entire Legation Staff steered shy of me. A very alert Police must have noticed this behavior. I did a little investigating and learned the State Dept. attitude in Sweden. I was reliably informed that the day after I reported to Ty in Stockholm, he told my informant, "He's dynamite, stay away from him".

An old friend of mine, an American, Countess B., was overjoyed when I 'phoned her a few days after my arrival. She set a date to give a dinner for me and said she would have our minister and several big shots there. The day before the date of the dinner, she called me, making lame excuses. I subsequently met her twice at functions. She was very ill at ease, talking to me. Had she been warned also, to stay away from me?

#### SECURITY:-

I left the United States on a troop transport as one of three civilians. I found the other two broadcasting their connection with our dept. I raised Hell with them and was told that they had been instructed that they were not under cover and could state their affiliation.

The Embassy in London is not secure. The Embassy in Stockholm lacks security.

#### TRANSPORTATION:-

On my way to the United States, I arrived in London to find the Freeze in force. This freeze could have been broken by orders for my return, from Washington. Security was the reason for the freeze and not lack of transportation. When the freeze was relaxed, other Government Departments started moving their civilians, mostly by air. Our department seemed able to do nothing. I was informed

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Page 4

**SECRET**Accomplishments:-

Dental Material Information

Drug Information

Dental Manufacturing Plants in Germany.

Drug Manufacturing in Germany

Air Manufacturing Plants in Cologne, Liverkusen, Berlin, Rathenow,  
Also a plant of twenty buildings in a forest thirty five K south  
east of Berlin (name of forest forgotten)

Report on Jet induction engine

Report on certain drug shortages in Germany

Minor Finnish information (I was invited to visit Finland by the  
Finnish Dental Society, seconded by Mannerheim; this invitation

I was instructed to turn down).

Report on hard metal, rustless steel, suture wire, sulphathiosol(  
(samples of these were forwarded)A very thorough ~~of~~ study of socialized dentistry in Sweden, full  
report to ADA, now in preparation. (October issue ADA Journal)Reprints of this will be furnished to be forwarded to interested  
parties in Sweden.Information on factory morale and the use of Russian Labor,  
and the use of Russian AA crews, protecting factories.Difficulties:-

As the representative of 58,000 dentists in the U.S., and as a  
Professor of Oral Surgery, I had expected some notice of my arrival  
to be taken by the Legation. They should have launched me, provid-  
ed introductions, etc. This was not done. Of necessity, I had to  
secure my own means of meeting essential people.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

Page 3

**SECRET**

After six weeks of cover work during which time I made some valuable contacts and passed along some info, I reported to Ty for orders. No orders were given me. I was, however, asked if I was ready to return to the U.S.. Meanwhile, I had leased a very suitable apartment. After another week, I again reported to Ty and informed him about a Mr. G. who I intended making my chief agent. This man was a veritable font of information. I had investigated him thoroughly. I told Ty all that I had found out, what his capabilities were, and what he wanted. I was instructed to send Mr. G. to W.S. This I did and the day after Ty instructed me to have no further contact with Mr. G. saying, that W.S. could handle Mr. G. with more safety. I was again asked if I were ready to return to the U.S. When I replied that I had just begun to operate, I was instructed to lay off Norway, Denmark, Finland, the Medical Profession, industry, Railroads, as any moves in these directions might interfere with someone else.

I set about getting some men to go to Germany, reporting weekly to Ty and asking for orders. I was instructed to report to W.S. and see if he could use me. This was the only affirmative order I ever received. W.S. asked me to secure a report on two individuals in one company (X 2 work) These reports I provided within a week. W.S., having no further chores, I reported back to Ty. I was asked to finish up my cover work and get ready to leave. Was told that I could not be kept under cover more than three months (this in spite of the actual facts). That as a civilian, I could not be protected (no protection was ever expected).

I had five professional men lined up to go to Germany. Cover for two of them was difficult. The three remaining looked promising. We were progressing very well on their exit permits and visas. The continual pressure for my departure bore fruit. I agreed to return to the U.S.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

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RESUME OF ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD**SECRET**

Before leaving the United States, the possibilities of my cover and contacts in Sweden had been thoroughly canvassed by Dr. H. and a general plan of operation formulated and agreed upon. In London I had two conferences with Dr. H. who had just returned from Stockholm. He told me to scrap my plans and report to Ty who would give me my instructions. I was to become part of his organization, probably his chief out-out, and that therefor it would well for me to secure a suitable apartment as early as possible.

Two days after my arrival in Stockholm, I reported to Ty who asked me what I had come for. I repeated my instructions and also told him of my original plans, cited my contacts and what I had hoped to accomplish. He said that I had not been requested nor expected, that he doubted that he could find anything for me to do, also doubted my ability to secure any information. However, he said since I had arrived, to go ahead with my cover job and he would see what could be worked out.

I developed my cover, secured the help of the Surgeon General (Director of Medicinalstryelsen) and his assistants. Also the friendship and help of the Social Minister (Statsrad). Under the aegis of the Surgeon General, I was given freedom of movement and traveled around the Southern Counties of Sweden, inspecting clinics and hospitals. I was invited to address professional societies and Rotary Clubs. Later I was consulted by the Riksdag committee on professional education and also by the committee drawing up a new corrupt practice act. I was invited to remain in Sweden and work for the Medicinalstryelsen. Still later, I was sounded out on my availability to take the chair of Oral Surgery in the contemplated new Dental School. I was booked for lectures to professional societies, both Medical and Dental up until July 1944.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

Page 1.

**SECRET**ITINERARY

Embarked	New York	October 31, 1943.
Arrived	England	November 2, 1943.
Embarked	Scotland	December 5, 1943.
Arrived	Sweden	December 5, 1943.
Embarked	Sweden	April 27, 1944.
Arrived	England	April 28, 1944.
Embarked	Scotland	July 25, 1944.
Arrived	New York	July 31, 1944.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**



17169  
index

**SECRET**

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**SQUAD**

**REPORT**

Page 1	Itinerary
Page 2	Resume of Activities in the Field.
Page 4	Accomplishments
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Page 5	Transportation.
Page 7	Comments & Recommendations.

**NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED**

S E C R E T

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 171697

Date Rec'd. SA. AUG 16 1961

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Helms	1050	8/16	8/17	MA	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 See Officer Designations and separate sheet.

S E C R E T

17 August 1944

TO: Chief, SI -- via Executive Officer, SI  
 FROM: Richard Helms, Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.  
 SUBJECT: Report of M. Henry Larsen

This is a report of a mission which was unhappy from the outset. Responsibility is difficult to establish even if it were desirable, and it would seem best to chalk this one off as a loss and learn from the lesson which it teaches.

In order to explain certain initials used in the report, I wish to point out that Dr. H. refers to Dr. Hoover, that Mr. G. refers to a former head of Swedish intelligence, and that W. S. is one of the officials in the American Legation in Stockholm.

Larsen's long step-over in London was due to the fact that we were unwilling to certify military urgency for him during the ban. Clearly, this could never be made clear to him personally.

The X-2 Mission in Sweden was established after Larsen had departed.

RM

RR/fah  
 Encl.

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
17 August 1944

TO: Chief, SI -- via Executive Officer, SI  
FROM: Richard Helms, Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.  
SUBJECT: Report of N. Henry Larsen

This is a report of a mission which was unhappy from the outset. Responsibility is difficult to establish even if it were desirable, and it would seem best to chalk this one off as a loss and learn from the lesson which it teaches.

In order to explain certain initials used in the report, I wish to point out that Dr. H. refers to Dr. Hoover, that Mr. G. refers to a former head of Swedish intelligence, and that W. S. is one of the officials in the American Legation in Stockholm.

Larsen's long stop-over in London was due to the fact that we were unwilling to certify military urgency for him during the ban. Clearly, this could never be made clear to him personally.

The X-2 Mission in Sweden was established after Larsen had departed.

*M*  
RH

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

DATE: 23 August 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions by N. Henry Larsen

There is submitted herewith Mr. Larsen's report on field conditions, with the comments of the Operations Officer for the Scandinavian Section, SI.

Transportation problems set forth in this report have been called to the attention of the London office. In a recent report the London office indicated that they were fully cognizant of the difficulties recently incurred in securing transportation in several cases, and steps were being taken to correct the situation. We have, however, called their attention again to the need for an improvement in their service to SI personnel passing through London.

*R. C. Foster*  
R. C. Foster  
Acting Chief

Attachment  
Larsen Report

SECRET

FROM: Helms

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .... 151100  
Field No. .... 151100

Date Rec'd. SA..... AUG 18 1944

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Reale	1215	AUG 18 1944		WMB	
2. Chief, ST	1312	AUG 19 1944	AUG 21 1944	R	
3. Reale				B	
4. Mr. Foster		AUG 23 1944		RCF	What becomes of this now?
5. Gen. Donovan				WJD by case	Mr. Foster: By order we are instructed to obtain reports on field conditions from OSS personnel and to submit those reports with comments to the Director, OSS. In those cases where it is possible to send such reports to the field for comments we are taking such action. Further, I have recommended to the Executive Officer, OSS, that all such reports should be prepared in the field before personnel return to Washington, and should be transmitted to Washington from the field with the comments of the Commanding Officer in the field. It does not seem feasible to return Mr. Larsen's report for comment and it is therefore suggested that it be forwarded as it stands.
6. A Col Doring					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Held for WJD					25 August WJMR

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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(20640)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : General Donovan  
 FROM : Lt. Colonel Doering  
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 24 September 1944

In regard to Lt. Beale's comment noted on the routing sheet, attached: Before Whitney Shepardson left, he vigorously requested a modification of your order that all returning officers write a report to be sent to the Director through the Branch Chief. Mr. Shepardson felt that this would result in your being presented with a distorted picture from officers who in many cases were being sent back for cause. He felt that such reports should be written in the field, and the head of the branch or the Strategic Services Officer in the field be given a chance to transmit the report here with their comments or explanations.

I promised to bring the matter to your attention, but stated that my own opinion was that if this were done, it would constrain and possibly eliminate the freedom of speech which you intended the report should contain. I further believe that if on reading the report you feel it requires explanation, it could be forwarded to the field for their comments. There is, however, this to be said in favor of Whitney's suggestion: That we are bound to have a sizable number of reports from officers of mediocre caliber which contain irresponsible and damaging charges which may never be answered on the record.

O. C. Jr.

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

5. Apparently another venture of Dr. Larsen was an attempt to organize a penetration of Germany by himself and some other individuals, one of whom was discovered to be a member of the Swedish police, and it was felt that the venture should not be undertaken. The action of Tykander and the other members of our mission was a reasonable one under the unfortunate circumstances. Dr. Larsen's mission was begun. Since there was much discussion as to the scope of the Doctor's mission and since he, an extremely conscientious and earnest, was not an experienced intelligence agent, Tykander felt that he should be permitted to operate in his own field and obtain whatever information he could but should not be permitted to endanger other intelligence projects already begun by the other members of the mission.

*J. J. Monigan, Jr.*  
J. J. Monigan, Jr.  
Major, CAC

Attachment

**SECRET**



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**SECRET****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Colonel Doering  
 FROM : Major Monigan  
 SUBJECT: Report of N. Henry Larsen

SECRETARIAT

DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1944

1944 OCT 12 PM 1 18

Filed report  
 x Larsen, N. Henry  
 x ETO

OSS

1. I discussed the attached report and the questions outlined by General Donovan with Lt. Richard Helms, USNR, and Mr. Taylor Cole on 11 October. Mr. Cole was at Stockholm during most of the time covered in Dr. Larsen's report. The facts appear to be as follows:

2. Dr. Larsen was recruited for a mission in Sweden and was not especially trained or qualified in intelligence work. His record at school was apparently not satisfactory. The nature of his mission either was inadequately explained to him or inadequately explained to Stockholm, since he felt his mission was much broader in scope than merely collecting information from dental practices and organizations in Sweden which was the understanding of our representatives there. Before Dr. Larsen arrived in Stockholm, Tykander sent a strong cable to London requesting that he not be sent. This was based upon Dr. Larsen's inadequate intelligence training which apparently enabled the British in Stockholm to make him an object of considerable ridicule as a secret agent. After this request of Tykander was not acted upon and Dr. Larsen appeared in Stockholm, as was the custom for new arrivals, he was instructed to lie low for awhile and to develop his cover and his cover contacts.

3. Dr. Larsen was apparently misinformed as to the nature of his mission and undertook to make arrangements to establish a one-man intelligence network covering Scandinavia and extending into Germany. It was apparently the understanding of our mission that Dr. Larsen's activities were to be confined to dental matters and not interfere with intelligence coverage already in existence. Dr. Larsen was instructed to confine his activities to his dental connections.

4. Mr. G was thought by Mr. Cole to be a person of pro-American leaning who was considered to be of some use to our representatives. The person was already known to WS, who was Walter Surrey, one of our representatives at the Legation. Since the contact had already been established and since considerable confusion was created by two different American contacts with the same individual, Dr. Larsen was instructed to pursue the matter no further.

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that I had to lie to them, telling them that I was in Italy too working for the American Red Cross, and that I had come to Cairo for a few days to recuperate from a nervous breakdown). I am ready to submit the list of those persons, with reports regarding their status before and after the occupation of Greece.

I reported to MO-ME Washington on 10 August 1944 for reassignment. It does not make any difference what that new assignment will be, so long as my services can be utilized to the fullest degree in the war effort, in accordance with my ability, experience and other qualifications.



Stevens Dukson, Sgt. AUS

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whom I requested an assignment, because I didn't want to loaf around. I told him I was ready and willing to undertake any kind of mission they would entrust me with, either alone or with other Americans. He promised that he would let me know within a few days.

Three days later, I was visited in our office in the Zamalek Building by Mr. Koleander of SI, who asked me if I knew anything about the Greek Maritime problems, and particularly, if I knew a Captain Abatiellos (President of the Union of Greek Captains) and I replied that I had never heard of him. Leaving me, Mr. Koleander told me that he would see me within ten days. I never saw him again.

The next day, Mr. Fistere told me that Colonel West wanted me in his office. I went there immediately thinking that they finally had an assignment for me. To my great disappointment he told me that there was no slot for me in any branch, and he asked me what I suggested. I told him that I had come there to work and if there wasn't anything there for me to do I suggested that I be sent back to the States. I told Mr. Fistere the same thing, and they both agreed that I should return to Washington.

I asked them to give me a three-day pass, which they did. I spent those three days in Cairo, where I came in contact with some high-ranking Greek officers, very old acquaintances of mine who were hostages in Italy and were freed during a commando raid. Two of them were Lt. Generals and all from my home town. From them I got a list of fifth-columnists during the Greco-Italian War, who after the collapse of Greece turned agents for the Secret Italian Organization, OVRA, and now are agents of Gestapo. I also got a list of names of persons who are reliable and Greek patriots, who can take and face any risk to help anyone working against the much-hated Germans. (It should be understood

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him why, since I had received Theater Commander Approval, that I was not allowed to proceed as planned, but he didn't answer me. I then said that if there wasn't anything for me to do in MO, I was willing to join one of the other branches--SO, SI or OG--for I was very anxious to get into Greece. He answered that I was too well-known in Greece, and that if I went there I would be endangering my life, for I would be caught within two or three days. (Mr. Fistere told me the same thing).

I replied to Colonel West that we are in a war, and that we have to fight with all the means we possess, and that I, personally, realized that I was endangering my life and was willing to--that I was aware of that fact when I joined this organization, and that what he told me was not reason enough for me to hesitate or to change my mind. I had volunteered for that kind of job, and the sooner I was sent in the better. Considering my ex-military status in the Greek Army, and the experience I gained, plus the special training schools I had completed in Washington, I felt that I qualified for any branch of this organization. Colonel West promised that he would let me know in a few days. Then, all of a sudden, he asked me if I wanted to go into Greece with a British mission. Having talked previously with some officers of our organization, I told him that I didn't want to go with a British mission unless I had a temporary commission, for I knew the Britishers very well. He laughed and told me not to say it outside, and I replied that I certainly wouldn't under any circumstances. Then he said that commissions were the job of Washington.

On Sunday, 13 June, Knapp and Los left for Greece.

On Monday, 14 June, I was called by Mr. Young, Chief, SI-ME, of

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**REPORT OF TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST

14 August 1944

To: Mr. W. C. Morek  
Acting Area Operations Officer, MO-ME

From: Sgt. Stevens Dukson

I left Washington by sea on 4 May 1944, and arrived in Cairo on 10 June 1944. Upon my arrival in the Theater, I reported to Mr. John Fistere, Acting Chief, MO-ME, who told me that they were awaiting me. A little while later, I was taken to the Zamalek Building, where the offices of our Branch are located. There I met Mr. Knapp, Sgt. Los and Cpl. Valtia. Mr. Knapp and Sgt. Los were preparing to leave for Greece within two days. I asked them to let me go with them, but they told me that it was too late then.

Mr. Fistere interviewed me and told me that there wasn't anything there for me to do for the time being, so I asked to be sent to the British Paratrooper's School. He told me it was needless because they don't jump any more. He suggested that I go to the Radio School for nine to twelve weeks. I told him that I cannot take any letter in code because I am tune-deaf. It was then decided that I be sent to Camp Russel Huckstep to occupy my time, because they didn't have room for me in the boathouse where I had stayed for a few days.

I asked Mr. Fistere to send me into Greece. I told him I wanted action, that being the purpose for which I came. He answered that he was going to talk it over with Lt. Colonel West, and the following day I was called into the latter's office at 8 Rustum Pasha, and was interviewed by him. He told me that there wasn't any slot at the present time, and that I should have to stay in Cairo. I asked

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**SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.15 101  
1-16/101 Report  
SECRETARIAT y Dukson  
1 me TO

1944 AUG 22 AM 10 33

18 August 1944  
OSS

To: Reports Officer  
Through: Major J. S. Miller  
From: David Williamson  
Subject: Report of Sgt. Steven B. Dukson

Herewith a report from Sgt. Dukson, prepared at my request upon his return from an ill fated voyage to Cairo.

It may be stated that Sgt. Dukson has shown the most admirable motivation throughout his training experience and that, if his abilities were not utilized against the enemy, it is no reflection on him.

DeW

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

To: Mr. Charles S. Cheston

-2-

28 August 1944

expectation that he might be used as originally planned or in some other capacity. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be the case as described in a letter received from Fister dated 22 June 1944, which reads in part:

"When Sgt. Dukson arrived here, it became apparent immediately he would be of little or no use to MO. This was verified by [redacted] statement that he did not want to work for MO; whereupon he was offered in turn, to SO, SI, [redacted] Break and the Labor Desk, the OG, and MO. None of these branches expressed the desire to have him.

"It would appear that a mistake had been made in sending Sgt. Dukson to us. As I understand it, although his training report was fairly complimentary, it was stated that he needed supervision and did not take well to discipline. I think that is a fair appraisal of the man. It is with considerable regret that we feel we have to return him. There is no doubt about his courage, in our minds, but all agree that his presence on any mission inside Greece would be likely to cause, to use a mild word, embarrassment."

4. Sgt. Dukson is extremely anxious to fight Germans, preferably in Greece. He is bitterly disappointed that OSS has been unable to use him. Although it is regrettable that better use has not been made of this man, and MO has a high opinion of him, I see no possibility of employing him in this Organization, and therefore recommend that he be turned over to PPP for re-assignment. MO has endeavored unsuccessfully to place him with SI and SO.

Attachment

*Edward L. Bissell*  
Edward L. Bissell  
Lt. Colonel, AUS  
Deputy Director - SSO

**SECRET**



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

*Field Report 15,101*  
*x Dukson, S.*

29 August 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Charles S. Cheston  
Acting Director

FROM:

Deputy Director - SSO

SUBJECT:

Sergeant Steven S. Dukson

*Approved*  
*CSO*

1. You request that I investigate and report to you with respect to Dukson which resulted in the report from Sgt. attached. The report is herewith

2. Sgt. Dukson, having been recruited in 1943, having been recruited in 1943, he was transferred to MO at their request, as at that time MO had a plan of infiltrating personnel into Greece. The assignment was described as a dangerous type of duty which appealed to Sgt. Dukson. Sgt. Dukson was given various types of MO training preparatory to his mission but was considerably delayed in being shipped to the Theater due to various administrative difficulties, among which was his change of name. As set forth in his memorandum, he finally reached Cairo 10 June 1944.

3. As you are aware, the management of MO changed between the time Sgt. Dukson was assigned to the Branch and the time he was shipped overseas. As a result of this change in management, there were changes in the plans for MO operations in the Cairo area. Those now in charge of MO Middle East feel that it would have been wise had they made a more careful appraisal of the prospective mission for which Sgt. Dukson was sent out, prior to his leaving this country. The man was originally obtained for service in Greece, for which he was well qualified as to language and experience, and when his transportation finally came through, he was sent along with the hope and

**SECRET**

OSS Form 2102

FROM:

S E C R E T

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

*Mr. Cal. Bingham*

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mail Room					
2. Mr. D. - file					For dispatch
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

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For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

S E C R E T

Lt. Colonel Roberts  
Personnel Procurement Branch  
Executive Office

*Field Reports*

15,101

*X. Dickson, S.*

1 September 1944

I have been instructed by the Acting Director to notify you that Sergeant Stephen S. Dukson can no longer be used by this organization and is made available to you for immediate reassignment.

Please keep MO Branch informed of the progress you make in this matter.

E. J. Putzell  
Lt., (ig) USNR  
Assistant Executive Officer

cc: Deputy Chief MO Branch

15, 101

100-1000

201-Dukson, Stephen S. (Enl) 1st Ind. HNB/jvs  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, Personnel Procurement Branch, Room 107,  
North Building, 25th & E Streets, Washington, D. C. 7 September 1944.  
TO: Executive Office, ATTENTION: Lt. E. J. Putsell.

1. Request subject EM be transferred to the Replacement Pool.
2. Any request for reassignment will be initiated by this Branch.

For the Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch;

cc; MO thru SSO.

2nd Ind.

H. M. BRITTEN, JR.  
1st Lt., CAC

9 September 1944

TO: Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch  
FROM: Executive Office

1. Please take this matter up directly with the Branch concerned.

15.101  
Putzell  
15.101

Lt. Colonel Roberts  
Personnel Procurement Branch  
Executive Office

1 September 1944

I have been instructed by the Acting Director to notify you that Sergeant Stephen S. Dukson can no longer be used by this organization and is made available to you for immediate reassignment.

Please keep MO Branch informed of the progress you make in this matter.

E. J. Putzell  
Lt., (jg) USNR  
Assistant Executive Officer

cc: Deputy Chief MO Branch

*Field Report 15,101*  
*x Dukson*



SECRET

Chief, SI, and Director, OSS

- 2 -

August 30, 1944

2. All of the above activities were suddenly terminated when, as a result of a partial reorganization of the SI Branch, ETO, the Italian and Albanian Desks were eliminated from the ETO-SI organization.

3. With regard to the R & D and C.D. Branches the work has progressed most satisfactorily to the extent that such branches are now fully established and at the time of my departure from London I felt as did the ETO-OSS Director that my mission with respect to the establishment of R & D and C.D. was fully completed. The R & D and C.D. Branch Chiefs during the course of the past few months were given full assistance in meeting and initiating necessary negotiations with their opposite numbers in the various British agencies and in the other Allied intelligence services. Also, they were given full assistance in developing to the fullest sources of document and camouflage intelligence.

(c) Conditions in the Field Which Might be Improved

1. In the sphere of my immediate activities the conditions developed satisfactorily. In the spheres of other OSS activities, because of the level in which I was operating, I feel I am not in a position to contribute useful comment as to improvement of existing conditions.

(d) Specific Difficulties in the Field

1. Difficulties in my sphere of activities arose from time to time as would be expected, but such difficulties were always overcome. The latest difficulty, however, namely, the elimination of the Italian-Albanian Desk due to the reorganization of the SI Branch, ETO, permitted no solution of the problem on my part as neither the Chief of the Italian Section, SI, Washington, nor I were consulted or permitted to express an opinion.

022

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15.128

Field Report  
Mazzarrini

August 30, 1944

The Chief, SI, and the Director, OSS.  
 Riccardo Mazzarrini, Italian Section, SI.  
Report on Field Conditions

In accordance with SI Directive dated June 10, 1944, under the above subject, the following report is submitted upon my return to Washington from London which I left on August 2 last:

(a) Activity in the Field

1. Was Chief of the Italian and Albanian Desks, SI, in which capacity I dealt with British intelligence agencies, primarily with S.I.S., in clearing current problems involving British policy and activities in Italian and Albanian affairs as directed by the Chief of the Italian Section, SI, Washington, and by chiefs of the Italian and Albanian SI missions in Algiers and later on in Italy.

2. Was active in the preliminary arrangements made towards the establishment of the R & D and C.D. Branches in ETO, and once these were established was appointed liaison officer to such branches for the purpose of taking care of SI requirements and needs.

(b) Progress of Work

1. With regard to Italian and Albanian affairs the work was progressing satisfactorily. Regular reports on current developments and informative matter were being sent to Washington and MEDTO, and by close contact with certain officials and Italian and Albanian elements in London, the situation was at all times under close scrutiny. Furthermore, considerable time and thought had and was being given towards having the Italian Desk, SI, ETO become an operational desk with a definite project duly approved by the Chief of SI Branch, Washington, the Chief of the Italian Section, SI, Washington, and by Lt. Col. William P. Maddox, when still Chief of SI, ETO. Such project contemplated the penetration of Northern Italy through France. Preliminary discussion on the subject as relating to the coordination of the Italian Section, ETO activities, with the Italian Section, MEDTO activities, took place between Col. Glavin, head of OSS, MEDTO, and myself. Personnel for the carrying out of the above project in the field was recruited, trained and indoctrinated.

SECRET





**CONFIDENTIAL**

Commander Andrew G. Carey  
Executive Office

15.135  
*Field Report*  
*Leary, Lewis*  
2 September 1944  
X MEVO-

Attached are two memoranda bearing on a  
Security problem created by mention of OSS in Travel  
Orders. Mr. Cheston feels that effective action  
should be taken to correct this situation and asks  
that you take such action as soon as possible to do  
so.

Robert Tarun  
Lt (jg) USNR  
Asst. to the Executive Officer

*Other memo -*  
*Security 15.132*

**CONFIDENTIAL**



JJK/fe

**SECRET** 57143

1 September 1944

From: Captain James J. Kamp, CE  
 To: The Director  
 Via: Administration Building  
 Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
 Subject: Report of Field conditions in ETO.

1. I have been in command of a Unit, training in underwater swimming and demolitions.
2. Due to cold water, adverse weather conditions and difficulties with the Lambertsen Breathing Apparatus, little progress was made in underwater swimming.
3. A demolition charge was made which allows a man to swim under water carrying at least two charges with no apparent lessening of speed and no added weight.
4. Swimming and physical conditioning was on the daily schedule.
5. It is my opinion that this Theater was no good as a training ground for this special type of work. Every means was exerted to combat cold water but no progress was made. This unit could not become operational while training under these conditions.

James J. Kamp  
 Captain, CE  
 Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D. C., 1 Sept., 1944  
 1st End.  
 JLR/vk  
 From: Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
 To: The Director  
 1, Forwarded.

J. L. RAICHE  
 Lt. Cmdr., USN (Ret)  
 Deputy Chief, MU

**SECRET**

JJK/fc

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**SECRET**

1 September 1944

From: Captain James J. Kamp, CE  
 To: The Director  
 Via: Administration Building  
 Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
 Subject: Report of Field conditions in AT.

1. I have been in command of a Unit, training in underwater swimming and demolitions.
2. Due to cold water, adverse weather conditions and difficulties with the Lambertsen Breathing Apparatus, little progress was made in underwater swimming.
3. A demolition charge was made which allows a man to swim under water carrying at least two charges with no apparent lessening of speed and no added weight.
4. Swimming and physical conditioning was on the daily schedule.
5. It is my opinion that this Theater was no good as a training ground for this special type of work. Every means was exerted to combat cold water but no progress was made. This unit could not become operational while training under these conditions.

*James J. Kamp*  
 James J. Kamp  
 Captain, CE

Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D. C., 1 Sept., 1944

1st End.  
 JLR/vk

From:  
 To:

Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
 The Director  
 Forwarded.

1.

*J. L. Raichle*  
 J. L. RAICHLE  
 Lt. Cmdr., USN (Ret.)  
 Deputy Chief, MU

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

The Director, OSS

- 2 -

2 September 1944

4. Since it was impossible to train for underwater swimming, the group for the remainder of their stay in ETO continued to stay in physical condition by going out on short swimming problems without the diving equipment, taking the usual type of physical training exercises and by taking long daily marches.

5. Due to the fact, primarily because of the coldness of the water, it was impossible to undertake an underwater swimming training program in ETO and, consequently, our group has been recalled to the United States for further training with new equipment.

*Frederic J. Wadley III*  
Frederic W. Wadley, III  
Lieutenant, AUS

1st End,  
JLR/fc

Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C., 4 Sept., 1944

From: Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
To: The Director, OSS

1. Forwarded.

*J. L. Raichle*  
J. L. RAICHLE  
Lt. Cmdr., USN (Ret.)

**SECRET**

15,145  
**SECRET**

FJW/lc

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**x Kamps, Capt James  
V 5 5 0

2 September 1944

From: Lt. Frederic J. Wadley, III, AUS  
 To: The Director, OSS  
 Administration Building  
 Via: Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
 Subject: Special Maritime Swimming Group in ETO, report on

1. The last week in April, I and the following men:

W. O. R. Butt, USCGR  
 CBM H. Radke, USCGR  
 CBM H. D. Caylor, USCGR  
 BM 2/c O. Anderson, USCG  
 CM 3/c G. Soltau, USNR  
 Cox. R. S. Kimball, USCG  
 Sp(X) 3/c G. Bennatts, USNR  
 Sgt. E. Stepner, USMCR

were dispatched to ETO to carry out a special operation in conjunction with plans as established by Shaef. Having been transported by plane from Patuxent, Maryland to Scotland, we arrived at our destination on May 1, 1944.

2. Upon our arrival we were contacted by OSS representatives in the field and were acquainted with the fact that it was necessary to begin training immediately for the problem since our dead line for the operation would be within a few weeks. Due to difficulties with our equipment, bad weather conditions and particularly due to the fact that the water was continuously cold, very little progress was made in underwater swimming. Originally we were assured that rubber suits would be provided to off-set the temperature of the water. These suits were of British manufacture and consequently manufactured for British personnel. It was found that these rubber suits were approximately twenty to thirty per cent too small for American personnel. New suits were manufactured for our specific use and these in turn, when they were used by our group, so restricted bodily movement as to rule out their use for underwater swimming.

3. The Lambertsen Diving equipment was not satisfactory and the report on this situation was forwarded to Washington. Since that date corrections have been made.

**SECRET**

cc Kamps 9/4

**SECRET**

RECEIVED

1344 SEP 4 PM 4 28

022

J. L. RAICHLE  
Lt. Cmdr., USN (Ret.)

Forwarded.

Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
The Director, OSSOffice of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C., 4 Sept., 1944Frederic J. Madley, III  
Lieutenant, AUS

4. Since it was impossible to train for underwater swimming, the group for the remainder of their stay in HVO continued to stay in physical condition by going out on short swimming problems without the diving equipment, making the usual type of physical training exercises and by taking long daily marches.
5. Due to the fact, primarily because of the coldness of the water, it was impossible to undertake an underwater swimming program in HVO and, consequently, our group has been recalled to the United States for further training with new equipment.

2 September 1944

- 2 -

The Director, OSS

**SECRET**



YFW/lc

*Field Reports*  
 11/5/44  
**SECRET**  
 X Cdo  
 X Kamp/Sabb.

2 September 1944

From: Lt. Frederic J. Wadley, III, AUS  
 To: The Director, OSS  
 Administration Building  
 Via: Deputy Chief, Maritime Unit  
 Subject: Special Maritime Swimming Group in ETO, report on

1. The last week in April, I and the following men:

W. O. E. Butt, USCGR  
 CEM R. Radke, USCGR  
 CEM H. D. Caylor, USCGR  
 EM 2/c O. Anderson, USCG  
 EM 3/c G. Soltan, USNR  
 Cox. R. S. Kimball, USCG  
 Sp(X) 3/c G. Bennetts, USNR  
 Sgt. E. Stegner, USMCR

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**SECRET**

FIELD REPORTS

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Branch:</u>	<u>Theater:</u>	<u>Tab:</u>
SUNUNU, EDWARD S. 14,921	MO	METO	A
CHEEVER, MAJOR BRUCE B. REARDON, 1st LT. F. J. 14,809	SO	ETO	B
SMITH, ROBERT K. 14,866	X-2	CBI	C
CARTER, COL C.C. 14,909	C.O. Italy	MEDTO	D
BREWSTER, CAPT. WM. L. 15,021	SI	NATO	E
McBAINE, LT CDR. TURNER H. 15,030	SI	METO	F
LARSEN, N. HENRY 15,100	SI	ETO	G
DUKSON, SGT. STEVEN S. 15,101	MO	METO	H
MAZZARRINI, RICCARDO 15,128	SI	E ETO	I
LEARY, LEWIS 15,135	SI	METO	J
KAMP, CAPT JAMES J. 15,145	MU	ETO	K
PECK, LT. CHARLES 14,565	MO	NATO	*



Memo to: Major Roger A. Pfaff

28 August 1944

13.

I wish to state in concl: that my remarks here about any of our allies are not in any way intended to convey a "pro" or "anti" feeling of any kind. My main idea is to present this information strictly from the point of view of its value to us as an American operation and its relation to vital American interests.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Major Roger A. Pfaff, Acting Chief X-2

DATE: 28 August 1944

FROM : AG/110

SUBJECT: Egypt assignment

## COVER

My assignment in Egypt was prepared and carried out completely under cover. The cover provided was ideal in every respect. First of all, the concern involved is one of broad international operations, having operated in Egypt for many years. By the very nature of its business, a company organization was already in being and numbered among its associates people of long standing and very well known to the company.

The immediate condition of the business was such as to require the presence in Egypt of a responsible company official in view of conditions brought about by alarming events, business-wise. Prominent in this regard were the absence of a responsible company representative; also, extreme developments which had previously required emergency measures in the control and supervision of the company's business.

From the foregoing, therefore, the need for a person directly representing the company may be appreciated. Furthermore, going to Egypt as a special head office representative enabled me to have complete freedom of movement about the country, although immediately guiding the company's office and affairs.

By the very nature of my company's broad operation, I was permitted to be in contact with practically every phase and category of business, economic, political or social activity - thus fortifying the character of my business assignment.

With respect to establishing fully my cover, it may be well to point out that it was necessary to consider the following elements:

- (a) The company's office force;
- (b) The company's organization throughout the country, as well as the company's competitors;
- (c) My dealings with the company head office, especially having to do with correspondence from my head office, which was subject to local British and Egyptian censorship; and
- (d) Our allies as well as our enemies.

## SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 September 1944

15-158  
Field Report  
1-7486-  
✓  
File

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: Roger A. Praff, Major, Inf.  
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

SUBJECT: Report on Egypt by X-2 under-cover Agent A2/110

We are transmitting herewith a report from the  
above-named X-2 representative which is most interesting.

Would you be so kind as to have this report  
returned to us when you have finished with it?

Roger A. Praff  
R. A. P.

Enclosure

Handwritten signature

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UWA

b

**SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.15,173  
4 September 1944

## MEMORANDUM

To: Director, OSS. *7/6358*  
 From: VAN PELT, Homer H., #~~518-11-05~~, Photographer, A-V(S), USNR.  
 Subj: Reports from Officers Returning from Field.  
 Ref: (a) Your memo dated 26 May 1944.  
 Via: Chief, Field Photographic Branch, OSS.

1. For the past six (6) months I have been in Turkey, where my duties were as follows:

Instructing in the use of cameras for microfilm.  
 Reproducing maps.  
 Copying German spy photos.  
 Perfecting means of concealing microfilm to be shipped into enemy territory (this was done by a stripping process). Copies of this process were sent to Comdr. E.E. Pratt, OSS, and also to the London Office, where they are improving the method.  
 Passport photos.  
 Falsifying passports and visas.

2. Joint meeting: Army Pictorial, 8th Air Force, Army Signal Corps, Field Photographic Branch, London, England. I was requested to rebuild a Model K-20 camera for ground work. Fairchild people have photos and blueprints of the alterations, and all concerned were very much pleased.

3. Prior to the time spent in Turkey, I was on a reconnaissance trip with Comdr. F. A. Spencer through the Middle East, for the purpose of finding the photographic needs of those branches. Equipment is needed badly -- mostly still and photostat.

*Homer H. Van Pelt*  
 Homer H. Van Pelt

**SECRET**





STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

15/194  
SECRET

TO : Director  
 FROM : Lt. Comdr. E. L. Taylor  
 SUBJECT: Comments on Major Scholtz' Report

DATE: 15 September 1944

1. Mr. Knollenberg has shown me a copy of a report by Major Scholtz stating that, in his opinion, British obstruction makes it unlikely that any effective intelligence work in Thailand can be carried out from Detachment 404, and recommending against the continuance of this Detachment.

2. In my opinion Major Scholtz' view of the situation in South East Asia Command is erroneous and his recommendation unsound. My reasons are as follows:

(a) OSS Detachment 404 is not completely dependent, as Major Scholtz believes, upon British means of transportation for our agents. Transportation by air for our agents can be obtained whenever needed from the American Air Forces. On the air side, there is no need ever to ask the British for facilities. The British do control submarine transportation, at least until such time as an arrangement can be made with Admiral Christie in Australia, and 404 has not been able to obtain as many submarines as have been asked for. On the other hand, it seems likely that we can count upon an average of two submarines per month for our operations until next February when the number may be increased.

(b) In order to obtain LAA clearance for our operations it is not necessary to communicate with the operational details to the British, and it is even possible, should it be desired, to carry out vital secret operations without their knowledge.

(c) It is inaccurate to speak in general terms of British hostility and obstruction in SEA.C. Relations with British authorities in the theatre on the whole are very good. Captains in G.I. uniforms and the Supreme Commander have both repeated to me their keen desire to see OSS continue to operate in SEA.C. There has been systematic obstruction and hostility on the part of one British organization, but, so far, this campaign has had no result except to draw

SECRET

Mr. Knollenberg

To read and return.

WJD

Director's Office

(320)

**b**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

DATE: 7 December 1944

SUBJECT: Report submitted by T/5 Antunovic

*Field report*  
*Antunovic*  
*Balkans*

1. Attached hereto is "Report of Soldier Returning from Overseas" submitted by T/5 Ivo Antunovic, who at the age of 42 voluntarily sought induction into the army in order to lead the Tunic Team into Yugoslavia. Unfortunately a leg injury sustained in training prevented this, and the report is therefore concerned with those duties which he undertook in order to provide for the dispatch of OSS teams into the Balkans, especially Yugoslavia.

2. Commenting on conditions in the field which might be improved, Antunovic makes the following points:

a. Education of agents should be expanded so that every man is specialized in some particular job.

b. Every man should receive a complete course in radio-telegraphy, photography and applied geography.

3. As far as specific difficulties which arose, Antunovic mentions the recurring problem of maintaining good cover. This, he states, is hampered by the following factors:

a. Lack of proper physical separation of the agent from the headquarters (Bari).

b. Lack of education of some agents concerning seriousness of maintaining proper cover.

**SECRET**

- 4 -

SECRET

<u>LEFT</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLYING TIME - HRS.</u>
Azores	* Presque Island, Me.	18-19	13
Presque Island	Bangor, Maine	19	.8
Bangor	Manchester, N. H.	19	1.2
Manchester	* Newark, New Jersey	19	1.3
New York	Philadelphia, Penn	22	.6
Philadelphia	Washington, D. C.	22	1

SECRET

10

- 3 -

SECRET

<u>LEFT</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLYING TIME - HRS.</u>
Dinjan	* Calcutta, India	4	3.5
Calcutta	Tezgaon, India	6	1.2
Tezgaon	Camilla, India	6	.5
Camilla	Fenney, India	6	.3
Fenney	Chittagong, India	6	.6
Chittagong	Tezgaon, India	6	.8
Tezgaon	* Calcutta, India	6	1.1
Calcutta	Bangalore, India	7	6.8
Bangalore	* Colombo, Ceylon	7	3
Colombo	Bangalore, India	10	3
Bangalore	Agra, India	10	6.2
Agra	* New Delhi, India	10	.8
New Delhi	* Karachi, India	12	4.3
Karachi	Jiwani, India	15	2.3
Jiwani	* Bahrein, Arabia	15	4.7
Bahrein	* Cairo, Egypt	16	9.6
Cairo	Bengazi, Libya	17	4.5
Bengazi	Tripoli, Libya	17	2.7
Tripoli	Algiers, Algeria	17	4.2
Algiers	* Casablanca, Morocco	17	4.6
Casablanca	Azores	18	6.2

SECRET



- 2 -

SECRET

<u>LEFT</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLYING TIME - HRS.</u>
Khartoum	Aden, Arabia	14	5.2
Aden	Salala, Arabia	14	4
Salala	* Masirah Island, Arabia	14	2.8
Masirah Island	Karachi, India	15	2.7
Karachi	New Delhi, India	15-16	4.2
New Delhi	* Agra, India	24	.8
Agra	Bombay, India	26	4.7
Bombay	Bangalore, India	26	3.7
Bangalore	Colombo, Ceylon	26	3
Colombo	Bangalore, India	July 8	3
Bangalore	* Calcutta, India	8	5.7
Calcutta	Dinjan, Assam	14	4.2
Dinjan	* Kunming, China	14	3.3
Kunming	* Chungking, China	17	2.5
Chungking	* Kweilin, China	18	2.6
Kweilin	* Kunming, China	2	2.6
Kunming	* Chungking, China	25	2.5
Chungking	Kunming, China	27	2.8
Kunming	* Dinjan, Assam	27	2.9
Nazira, Assam	* Dinjan, Assam	Aug. 2	1
Dinjan	Myitkyina	3	2.3
Myitkyina	* Dinjan, Assam	3	1.3

SECRET

**SECRET**APPENDIX "A"ITINERARYLt. (jg) George C. Demas, USNR  
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NOTE: Places marked with \* indicate overnight or duty stops;  
other places indicate stops for gas.

<u>LEFT</u>	<u>ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLYING TIME - HRS.</u>
Washington, D.C.	* Miami, Florida	June 2	7
Miami	* Camaguay, Cuba	6	3
Camaguay	* Puerto Rico	7	4
Puerto Rico	Trinidad	8	4
Trinidad	Georgetown, British Guiana	8	2
Georgetown	Amapa, Brazil	8	3.5
Amapa	* Belem, Brazil	8	1.5
Belem	* Natal, Brazil	9	5.4
Natal	Ascension Island	10	8.4
Ascension	* Accra, Gold Coast	10-11	7.5
Accra	Kano, Nigeria	12	4
Kano	* Maiduguria, Nigeria	12	2
Maiduguria	El Fasher, Anglo Egyptian Sudan	13	4.7
El Fasher	* Khartoum, Anglo Egyptian Sudan	13	2.8

**SECRET**

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SECRET

GENERAL COMMENTS

In the portion of this report dealing with China, I have mentioned on several occasions what might appear to be minor matters regarding transportation and some seemingly petty difficulties. It appeared to me, however, that these were probably some of the most important problems to be faced. The transportation problem goes back to the "Hump" problem. At the present time, under our Directive, we are to operate in China under SACO only, at least in our own name. AGFRTS is essentially a joint operation and while Colonel Smith quite frequently allows strictly OSS tonnage to come over on the AGFRTS allowance this is highly unusual and on a catch-as-catch-can basis. If we are going to operate in China with some degree of independence, under whatever form, some satisfactory arrangement will have to be made for the "Hump". If we cannot support the activities of 25 men except on a day-to-day basis, we can never hope to carry on activities ten times that size, which the situation would easily warrant, without solving this problem satisfactorily in the first instance.

*George C. Demas*  
*Staff USNR*

GEORGE C. DEMAS  
Far East Theater Officer

SECRET

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SECRET

Washington I brought this to the attention of the Services Branch and found that just prior to my return they had already started sending supplies directly by commercial line.

VII. New Delhi

OSS has two types of establishments in New Delhi. One R&A where people from both SEAC and CBI are assigned and are apparently working in harmony, and the other Lt. Colonel Harry L. Berne and his staff. Colonel Berne, while technically under Colonel Heppner, is actually performing services functions for both Theaters. In New Delhi are the headquarters for CBI as well as for SOS. Air priorities for the movement of both men and supplies to the Far East require approval of headquarters in the Theater. Similarly approval from SOS headquarters in the case of supplies of a restricted category drawn in the Theater by any of our units has to be approved by SOS headquarters. Colonel Berne is doing both these jobs in an able fashion. The number of air priorities being issued for our personnel has increased tremendously in the past several months. Finally Colonel Berne and his staff are processing personnel moving through New Delhi to both Theaters.

SECRET

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SECRET

The area has no separate T/O and as a result the Services personnel must be taken from both SEAC and CBI. While this has caused no difficulty as yet, the over-all shortage of Services personnel in both of these Theaters makes this a potential source of friction.

In the anticipated expansion of Far East activities, with the consequent increase of the use of Calcutta as a port of entry, the assignment of more Services personnel to Calcutta and to such other ports of entry for supplies as may be feasible should be a first consideration.

Prior to my departure from Washington requests had come from Colonel Heppner that supplies for SEAC be sent direct to Colombo. While in Calcutta I inquired of the Army Transport system as to the possibility of such shipments and was advised that all Army ships, even though stopping temporarily at Colombo, discharged their full cargo in Calcutta. This meant that cargo destined for Ceylon came nonetheless to Calcutta for reshipment with a consequent delay of weeks and sometimes months. So long as Army Transport is used this is unavoidable. I also talked, however, to the local representative in Calcutta for the War Shipping Administration and was advised by him that commercial vessels would take shipments direct to Colombo. Upon my return to

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- a. Actual lack of supplies
- b. Hump transportation difficulties
- c. Insufficient T/O
- d. Insufficient recruiting in spite of the T/O
- e. Insufficient information in the hands of the

Branches here with the consequent failure to produce on time. This does not mean that the information was wilfully withheld but was simply a case of lack of knowledge of details here.

#### VI. Calcutta

For administrative purposes Calcutta is a Branch Headquarters of Detachment 101 and is therefore under CBI. Lt. Colonel McGehee is the Commanding Officer. Major Falknor, head of Communications for the entire Far East, likewise makes his headquarters in Calcutta. For administrative purposes the Communications headquarters is also under Detachment 101.

Actually Calcutta services both SEAC and CBI, both for personnel and supplies arriving and for recruitment of natives for both Theaters. Similarly, of course, Major Falknor uses Calcutta as his headquarters in receiving and dispatching Communications equipment and personnel.

Colonel McGehee had assumed command in June and from all appearances this new arrangement is working satisfactorily. The immediate need is for more Services personnel.

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The organization of AGFRTS technically is as follows:  
USAF organized 5329 AGFRTS as a provisional unit of the 14th Air Force. The 14th then assigned 13 officers and 2 enlisted men to OSS - simultaneously they were attached to AGFRTS. OSS at the same time attached its men to the unit. Reports, etc., of the Unit are therefore made to both the 14th Air Force and to Colonel Coughlin.

My over-all impressions of AGFRTS are as follows:

1. OSS has an excellent chance to contribute to the war effort through AGFRTS, although not in the name of OSS.
2. AGFRTS offers an opportunity for every Branch and type of OSS work. In the present condition of SACO, AGFRTS may be our only real opportunity in China. If it fails, we may well be out of China at a time when we could be most helpful.
3. The number of minor irritations could conceivably cause major difficulties and serious damage. These have been brought to Lt. Colonel Peers attention. He has undoubtedly notified Colonel Coughlin and remedial steps have been taken.

Some of these difficulties, and their causes, are as follows:

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training, however short, that would have had to be given at Kweilin, would strain their limited facilities even more.

Several minor items of irritation existed. None of them serious in themselves, but quite serious in toto. These included among others:

a. Communications supplies and personnel. These were subsequently satisfactorily handled on the spot by Major Willis and Major Falknor, who arrived about three days after I did.

b. Improper servicing from our people at Kunming. This was largely due to shortage of personnel in Kunming itself, which has since been relieved.

c. Failure of OSS to make good on some of its promises. Other commitments, priority of other theaters and "Hump" and other transportation problems brought about delays in performance that were proving embarrassing in Colonel Smith's relations with the 14th Air Force.

d. Lt. Colonel Smith himself is an able, experienced officer. However, he has been overseas 27 months, most of this time in China and is tired and possibly irritable. He has no competent second-in-command to relieve him while he is on the job or take his place when he leaves. Colonel Coughlin is undoubtedly taking care of this situation locally.

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uncertain because of the status of the Changsha campaign and the Japanese drive southwest. The Japanese had advanced as far as Lingling which meant that at any moment our people would have to walk out. At the time of my stay most of the Army establishments had been evacuated. The only things remaining were the 14th Air Force and its headquarters establishment and the AGFRTS headquarters.

Transportation to and from Kweilin is extremely limited. ATC runs planes from Kunming from time to time, but they do not operate a schedule and good reason must be shown before passage can be obtained. CNAC runs a plane every two weeks from Chungking. The difficulty there is that CNAC is Chinese and possible Tai Li controlled. Since SACO is not doing business in Kweilin, and all OSS men are ostensibly in China only for SACO, it is difficult to justify use of CNAC, or as a practical matter to get passage on it.

Lt. Colonel Smith had no complaints whatsoever regarding the quality of OSS personnel given him. While he could use many, many more he was not asking for them at the moment because of the imminent possibility of his having to walk out. Additional personnel at that moment would have meant not only that they in turn might have to walk out even before they got into operations, but the necessary preliminary

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We had to rely on one broken down sedan for transportation in Chungking and in Kunming, our headquarters, we had a borrowed jeep. Navy seemed adequately provided and, in fact, most of our movement in and out of the Valley is by Navy jeeps.

We have no air transport within China. Navy has two C-47's for its use in China.

After endless months of preparation and discussion Captain Hykes was ready to move east out of Kweilin with a small group of Chinese trained in SI and Communications. It was a SACO project and travel was effected only through the efforts of Colonel Smith of AGFRTS. When we called on the Chinese to provide a truck to move the men and their equipment from a house outside of Kweilin, or that vicinity, to the air strip, the Chinese claimed they had no truck. Captain Hykes claimed, and Major Wilkinson, Major Dow and Captain Gleason told me that at that time the Chinese had a number of trucks in and around Kweilin.

#### V. AGFRTS

Headquarters for AGFRTS was at Kweilin, China, where we have our own small compound. Lt. Colonel Smith is the Commanding Officer. The only personnel there being those necessary for permanent administration. The situation was

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I gathered the distinct impression that OSS-SACO is largely impotent; that while the feelings of our men there are mixed the general outlook is not hopeful and the feeling of over-all futility exists; that Commander Miles and his Navy complement are far more active, are producing more, and have a standing far more solid, acceptable and responsible than ourselves. Some of the facts which give rise to this feeling among our personnel and my impression of the situation are as follows:

We found extreme difficulty in getting a few gallons of gasoline, we had to borrow stationery to do our work, and generally count our "Hump" traffic in pounds. During one of those months the Navy portion of the SACO tonnage reached 130 tons while we got nothing.

From his discussions with General Tai Li, but the results are presently unknown.

Recent cables indicate that Major Wilkinson has returned from his discussions with General Tai Li, but the results are presently unknown.

happen when General Tai Li was away.

authority themselves. As a result nothing ever seemed to

absence. There he did leave behind feared to assume any

speaking with authority and give the necessary approvals in his

b. Failure of General Tai Li to appoint someone to

and give necessary approvals, or

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I first met Major Wilkinson in Kunming where he was awaiting transportation east. Shortly thereafter I met him again in Kweilin where I had an opportunity to discuss the SACO picture in more detail. The monthly reports give the information of particular operations planned or in being and the difficulties being encountered. Earlier this spring the picture looked very black and operations seemed to consist of nothing more than endless discussions. Late this spring the picture appeared much brighter. Specific operations were being planned and the necessary cooperation from the Chinese appeared to be forthcoming. In June the picture looked black again. Major Wilkinson stated that in the case of several operations, which had already come through the long drawn out discussions and had apparently been fully approved, they had been reopened for further discussions. Major Wilkinson was on his way east to meet General Tai Li at the latter's request for more discussions. Major Wilkinson thought it was to deal with OSS's failure to "get going" and was fully prepared to lay the blame entirely on the Chinese. He felt that SACO really had a chance to do something; that most of the delay arose from

- a. Failure of General Tai Li to either remain at headquarters where he would be available to make decisions

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therefore by Navy jeep. The "Hump" situation was such that for many months no jeeps could be brought over.

These seemingly small items - a few gallons of gasoline and a jeep or two - seriously curtailed our activities and are mentioned to show how completely our people are dependent upon others.

Mr. Christian had only recently arrived in Chungking and Colonel Hall spoke most enthusiastically of him. We were unable to contact him, however, since he was not due to meet again with Colonel Hall until a few days after I left and because no transportation was available to get to him in the meantime.

Colonel Hall had arranged for the rental of a separate OSS house in town. This has been reported on fully by Colonel Hall, but essentially it was a means of providing OSS with a house for R&A and for Mr. Christian's activities outside of the Valley. It was taken in the name of Lt. Colonel Smith of AGFRTS for reasons of cover.

#### IV. SACO

The subject of SACO can properly be put under a heading separate from that of Chungking and comments can be based almost entirely on my talks with Colonel Hall, Major Wilkinson and several of the other officers.

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situation which had been so bad as to raise serious problems, has been considerably improved. Our men took great delight in the fact that for the men in the Valley assigned to Commodore Miles an invitation to dinner at the OSS house is something to look forward to. Several physical difficulties existed in the Valley however, quite apart from the nature of an outrageous climate which effected the strength and health of men stationed there too long. While I was there and for three weeks prior the generator which supplies electricity for our establishment, as well as that of Navy, had broken down. This meant that during this period our people were without lights. One of the officers had brought with him a small Army Coleman lamp with five gallons of white gasoline. When I left only a few hours supply was on hand and none was available locally or in Kunming. Inability to get even a few gallons of gasoline to remedy this situation with dispatch, despite the repeated cables, meant that work after dark was largely shut down.

The only transportation from the Valley was an old, worn out LaSalle, contributed to OSS by General Tai Li, which spent most of its time in the shop. The only dependable transportation to and from the Valley for our people was

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Major MacCarthy was doing an excellent job under the most difficult circumstances.

I mention the circumstances because there may be, or already have been, some complaints on the partial breakdown that inevitably resulted.

The only transportation was one jeep which Major MacCarthy had borrowed back in February from the 14th Air Force "for a few weeks", and which the 14th had since demanded back by August 1. The "Hump" situation was such that while I understand one or two jeeps finally got over, it was only after many months of waiting and cabling.

### III. Chungking

While at Chungking I stayed at the OSS house in the Valley. Commodore Miles was not in Chungking at the time and I met the Acting Commanding Officer, Commander Wight, in town. Navy courtesy would have required my calling on Commodore Miles but under the circumstances a call was unnecessary.

I met Major Wilkinson, the Commanding Officer at Chungking, in Kunming and later in Kweilin. My talks with him are summarized later in the report under SACO. I spent several days in Chungking and talked at length with Colonel Hall and with several of our other officers. The mess

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II. China

Colonel Coughlin has established his headquarters for CBI at Kunming. In his absence (Colonel Coughlin was in the United States during my visit to China) Major MacCarthy was Acting Commanding Officer at Kunming, while Colonel Peers was Acting Strategic Services Officer for CBI. Major MacCarthy was extremely and embarrassingly shorthanded. His only other officer, Ensign Mykland, spent six weeks in the hospital and several more weeks at a rest camp with a serious case of jaundice. It meant that Major MacCarthy was the Commanding Officer, the Services officer who arranged transportation north, south and west of Kunming, who read and approved all cables and answered most of them, who met people at the air field and who managed the OSS house in town and the warehouse on the other side of the air strip, who served as mess officer, house committee, reception committee and entertainment committee for everyone involved and who did these things alone. The natural result was a partial breakdown in the functioning of the headquarters. Just before I returned to India from China two officers and a few enlisted men from Detachment 101 were sent up by Colonel Peers and conditions were considerably alleviated. It was my impression that

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The monsoon heat and mud and the malaria (which assumed epidemic proportions, reaching 100% in one camp which had to be condemned) was taking its toll, particularly in view of the stepped up operations. Without effecting morale unduly, the matter of replacement and leave was ever present in the minds of most. Replacement of men who have been there some time is being, and will largely be, taken care of by normal recruitment of more SO, Communications and Services personnel. A particularly knotty problem is presented, however, in the case of the Field Photographic men, most of whom have been there over a year, who are particular specialists and who occupy Navy slots.

The integration of some of the Branches, who have not been represented at Detachment 101 in the past, into the organization, which was originally established and to some extent exists today on an Army rather than a Branch basis, has not been difficult. This can be ascribed almost entirely to the calibre of the Commanding Officer and the men sent out. Reasonable men approaching the problem in an intelligent manner find no difficulty. Lt. Cox for example has represented R&A for a comparatively short time and is doing an excellent job and has been described by Colonel Peers as an extremely valuable and likable addition to the Detachment and his work is of great help to everyone concerned.

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Typical of the spirit displayed by our men was that of Captain Parker. When I arrived early in the morning the mud was well over my knees. During the day the temperature rose to what I was told was 130° and by midday, dust rose in clouds. Captain Parker, who had been there well over a month, had a bad case of malaria with recurrent attacks of high fever, but stayed on the job. After I left Kyitkyina I mentioned to Colonel Peers that Captain Parker was in bad physical shape and probably ought to be moved. Colonel Peers told me that he was aware of it and that he had tried to get Captain Parker out but that the only way this could be done was to order him out on threat of court martial; that he had been there in the early stages of the attack and was going to be there when the town fell if it killed him. It was a matter of days or even hours, and Captain Parker was allowed to stay.

Most of the men who went out with the original Detachment 101 group have returned or are about to return or leave. Colonel Peers hopes to be able to return for a short leave this fall. Conditions at that time will determine whether he is able to do so. Morale is high and an esprit de corps exists even among the newer men that I found nowhere else.

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liarities of SEAC are such that, unlike CBI, half a job cannot be done with half the men and half the equipment; that unless we conclude it is worth going all the way and accordingly furnish all the men and materials they need, any partial furnishing would be completely wasted.

C B II. Detachment 101

The story of Detachment 101 has already been described in detail from many angles and needs no embellishment at this point. During my visit I made it a point to look not only at headquarters but at the various camps and establishments in the area - at Dibrugarh and Dinjan. On Colonel Peers instructions I visited Myitkyina before the city fell and watched our people at work there. A unit of the Field Photographic Branch was waiting the actual fall of the town so they might make a pictorial record. Captain Parker and Lt. Brophy conducted the interrogation of all prisoners who were brought in in the first instance. The Japanese prisoners were being turned over to G-2, while natives were handled by our own people. In all cases, however, our people retained any items, such as maps, passes and other documents, which might be of value to the R&A Branch.

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they likewise are afraid that the existence of the doubts may mean that they will get less preferential treatment and will be neglected by way of supplies and personnel so that there will not be enough to satisfy all needs. This, of course, is not expressed by them but is an impression distinctly my own. I mention it because I think it is important in servicing this Theater from Washington and in understanding some of the communications received here from time to time.

2. The CBI Theater, both Detachment 101 and China, are doing a job in exact proportion, plus a little more, to the help and servicing we give them. The choice is ours, in a sense, to determine the extent of the job that CBI will do. Some supplies and men have always been available in this Theater and by the proper liaison and approach by our excellent Commanding Officers many of the needs have been filled from local sources, both American and otherwise. In the case of SEAC, however, the amount of personnel and equipment obtainable locally is extremely small. I believe that the decision that Washington must make with respect to this Theater is to go ahead with full support in every way or to abandon the matter and withdraw our people, if this is politically possible. It is my firm belief that the pecu-

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driver, and the vehicle may never be seen again. Road conditions are bad and maintenance becomes a serious problem. With the increase in the flow of supplies and personnel of the other Branches the Services problem is rapidly approaching the critical stage. If it were not for the fact that local labor is available for some purposes, Services functions would have broken down completely by this time. To add to its problems SEAC has had to assign men from its limited T/O to the Calcutta area to assist in the handling of supplies which arrive there for both Theaters.

No other Branches were yet represented on the island.

Before concluding with SEAC, I should like to make two observations:

1. Both before I left Washington and on my return, there seemed to be considerable question as to whether OSS-SEAC would ever be able to contribute materially to the war effort. This was partly from a feeling that SEAC itself, under Lord Mountbatten, would be given no important function to perform and partly from the feeling that OSS, based on Ceylon, was too far from the enemy geographically to do much good. Our people in Ceylon are well aware of the existence of these doubts. It has not effected their morale, nor has it slowed down their organization and planning for operations. They, of course, feel they have a large part to play; but

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were on the way. Lt. Commander Kenneth Pier, USNR, was nominally the head of Field Photographic for both SEAC and CBI. There was some discussion as to whether he would leave the Branch entirely and assume the position of Chief of Maritime-SEAC.

14. Services

This Branch finds itself under a tremendous handicap by reason of shortage of personnel. It has a lot of diversified work to do and a large area to cover. In addition to the regular station complement required at headquarters and at the various camps, personnel is required for warehousing in various areas and in Colombo; for servicing the transient personnel at Colombo; transportation of supplies and equipment from one establishment to another; clerical help; of the adjutant type; guard duty; maintenance; and a good deal of construction, both physical and supervisory. While a considerable amount of the physical work is done by native labor, the native labor needs supervision. Native cooks and kitchen helpers are available and are used but must be supervised by American military personnel or the food will be contaminated or stolen. Vehicles can be driven locally by natives but American military personnel is required on the long hauls from camp to camp or the supplies, the

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trained, he has taken care of the medical needs in Kandy, in the center of the Island; at Trincomalee, 120 miles by jeep to the Northeast; and at Colombo, 60 miles by train to the Southwest; and at Galle, 60 miles by jeep from Colombo. I understand, however, that shortly after I left some help arrived and that more is on its way.

Medical conditions on the island are fairly good. Malaria has not been extensive, nor have any of the tropical diseases, with one exception, effected our personnel. The one exception relates to dengue fever, which most, if not all, the women contracted at one time or another during the first few months. Commander Murphy has been making every effort to avoid a recurrence.

13. Field Photographic

This Branch is represented in the Theater by Lt. Norton, USNR, recently arrived. While at the time it was not clear whether Lt. Norton was Branch Chief, he appeared to be making excellent progress in the establishment of the necessary relationship with the British and the Dutch and had made plans with them for the filming of a Japanese escape film. In addition, he was well underway in the preparation of a building with facilities for the development of photographic work. Badly needed personnel and supplies

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9. Registry

This Branch, headed by Miss Julia McWilliams, has the necessary additional help on the way and is doing an able job.

10. Visual Presentation

This Branch, headed by Mr. Paul Child, is doing a considerable amount of work for SEAC as well as for our own Branches. The so-called "war room" with various maps and other visual devices was under preparation and the work of the Branch was proceeding in a satisfactory manner. One difficulty has been that this was formerly a Branch of Services. Now that it has been made a separate Branch it has no T/O of its own on which to work and it has an extreme need for a small number of well equipped specialists.

11. Schools & Training

Colonel Heppner has been badly handicapped in the work of this Branch because of the failure of Dr. Enders to work out. The only Schools and Training personnel were those borrowed from the other Branches.

12. Medical Services

Lt. Commander Murphy, the only medical officer on the island, has been doing a good job under terrific conditions. With a few technicians and a few natives, whom he

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to keep the efforts of his Branch directed towards the enemy; and to avoid any repetition of mistakes that might possibly have been made in the past.

7. R&A

Miss Cora du Bois has been doing an excellent job with very limited facilities and personnel. For the time being she has been concentrating on work for our own Branches in Detachment 404, with special requests for SEAC being handled from time to time. However, these outside requests are becoming more numerous and because of the personnel shortage she is able to take on only the most essential ones. Until more personnel arrive, R&A will be unable to service Washington properly (several individuals of the R&A Branch have just arrived with a few others apparently on the way). By and large she has been getting able assistance from Registry and from some of the other girls, which permitted her to do considerably more work than she otherwise could have done.

8. Security

Lt. Gilmartin had been there a short time and several assistants had just arrived or were on their way. He had commenced the establishment of the standard security processes and was studying the local situation for particular problems peculiar to the Theater.

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5. SI

SI needs personnel. Mr. Dillon Ripley, Chief of SI, made certain specific recommendations on the type of personnel required for his Branch, which has already been reported on directly and which I have taken up with the Branch itself. Generally it is that men with language and/or area background are required only on a policy level, while those on a lower level need only be young, smart, energetic officers. Language and area background are desirable but not required.

6. X-2

At the time of my visit X-2 had no representative in Ceylon. I had several talks with Major McDonough, both at Detachment 101 and in Calcutta, who advised that the X-2 representative for Ceylon was on his way. In this connection, it is important to note that it has been necessary to set up X-2 on a basis slightly different from the established OSS Theaters. All of India, Ceylon and Assam, including Detachment 101, are under Major McDonough who makes his headquarters in New Delhi. These men are all assigned to SEAC, although those in Assam are on detached service from Detachment 101. I was impressed with Major McDonough's sincere desire to keep his Branch functioning under the over-all supervision of the respective Strategic Services officers;

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on the over-all reproduction needs and the proper location and division of reproduction facilities.

8 The needs of MO in the way of personnel have been outlined in the regular reports. At this time the problem is one of finding the necessary individuals as well as of finding the necessary "slots". On a priority basis those needed immediately are the desk heads, while the others can come along in due time. At the present time, Mr. Bateson is the only mature person on hand. (Lt. Bonamy, USNR, with the approval of Mr. Scofield has been in charge of the establishment of the Chittagong base. It is anticipated that his transfer from MO will be made a permanent one.)

4. MU

For obvious reasons a good deal of SEAC's operational activities will depend on the functioning of a good Maritime Unit and the availability of boats and other Maritime equipment. At the present moment, because of the illness of Lt. Fisher Howe, a new Chief of Maritime is needed. Fuller details concerning the needs of the Unit can best be given by Major Lichtman of the Maritime Branch in Washington, who has just returned from a visit to Ceylon, and by Lt. Howe himself who has just been returned to this country for reasons of ill health.

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rigorous and everyone seems to be working with enthusiasm.

2. SO

This Branch is headed by Captain Walter Mansfield, USMCR, a recent transfer from METO. As in the case of Major Peddicord, Captain Mansfield is old enough to have had the necessary experience and background for his job and young enough to have retained his enthusiasm, energy and durability. Most of his personnel had not arrived but his plans were to work closely with Major Peddicord.

3. MO

I talked several times with Mr. Scofield who had been MO Chief and only recently had been made Chief Planning Officer. The greatest need at the present time for MO-SEAC is, therefore, a new Chief. In the meantime Mr. Scofield is very enthusiastic about the chances of MO and regarded qualified personnel as MO's greatest need. Worthy of comment at this point was what appeared from the field to be a tendency from Washington to make plans on reproduction needs for MO and other Branches without consulting those in the field on their needs. I believe this was largely a matter of misunderstanding since shortly before my departure Lt. Caldwell of the Reproduction Division had arrived to survey and report

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## II. Branches

Colonel Heppner is making every effort to organize and carry on OSS activities within the Branch organization and is generally meeting with success in this respect. An Operations Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of SO, MO, OG, MU and SI had been established. Full details have been covered in regular monthly field reports and will not be repeated here. This arrangement seems to be working satisfactorily. In essence, it provides that any operation entered into by OSS-SEAC is presented first to this Committee for thrashing out and approval and for proper coordination of the respective Branches that might be concerned before it is submitted for approval to the "P" Division of SEAC.

As to individual Branches the following comments are worthy of note:

### 1. OG

Major Peddicord, on detached service with OSS from SEAC, is an experienced, able and enthusiastic officer who has handpicked a group of men for OG operations. I met some of these men before leaving the States and a few others while in Ceylon. From my own observations of them and from comments made by others, they are some of the finest men of their type available today. Their training course is

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both by air and by sea. It is the terminus of air lines from India and the trip to headquarters at Kandy is by train. Similarly it is the port of debarkation for supplies coming in either from Calcutta or directly from the United States. The main store rooms and warehouses are located here, with substations at our other establishments on the island.

The climate on the island is exceptionally good, particularly considering the fact that it is located so near the equator. The other natural disadvantages however - mosquitos, leeches, etc. - are present in profusion.

5. "X" Camp

This camp, not yet established at the time of my visits, is intended largely as a holding area for new native agent recruits.

6. Chittagong

This is a forward area which has probably been completed by this time and is intended for a base for SEAC operations into central and lower Burma and on the mainland generally. Contact had been established with the British forces operating along the coast as far as Akyab and liaison with the British authorities in the area was apparently good. Radio towers had been built and the camp was "ready for business".

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planned. On my second visit to Ceylon on 10 August 1944, on the way back to Washington, the organization had been pretty well set up and construction largely completed. Some of the necessary personnel to fill in the framework had arrived, with others on the way or promised. They had largely passed out of the construction phase and entered into the operations.

2. Trincomalee

This camp is established about ten miles from the British Naval Base at Trincomalee, at the shore's edge in the jungle. It is intended that this camp, which offers complete isolation, will be used for the training of native agents.

3. Galle

It is intended that the Galle camp, which is located a few miles from the town itself on a hill top several hundred feet above the shore, and offering excellent opportunities for training and conditioning, will be used for training American or non-native personnel. Trincomalee and Galle have alternate monsoon conditions so that both rough and smooth surf are available at all times at one of the other.

4. Colombo

Colombo is the main port of entry to the island,

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SEACI. GeneralA. Physical Establishments1. Kandy

Headquarters SEAC is located on a former coconut plantation a few miles outside of Kandy itself and from Admiral Mourtbatten's headquarters for SEAC in the Botanical Gardens. At our headquarters are residences for all our personnel except civilian women (who are billeted at the Queens Hotel in town). Here too are the offices for Lt. Colonel Heppner and his immediate staff and for most of the Branch Chiefs and their immediate assistants. Colonel Heppner occupies the "bungalow", the only structure of a permanent nature, which was the residence of the former manager of the plantation. The rest of the buildings are temporary, basha type, and as such are most inexpensive as well as easily constructed. They are quite adequate and additional buildings can easily be erected as needed.

I first visited Ceylon on 26 June 1944, at which time OSS had been on the island for less than two months. At that point physical construction and organization occupied most of the attention of our people, although one operation (Sugarloaf II) had already taken place and others were being

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time the extent of our activities in China are limited in almost exact proportion to the amount of tonnage that can be moved out of Calcutta and the various depots in Assam over the "Hump". The natural corollary to this is that the question of "Hump" transportation must be a prime consideration in any planning for OSS activities in China.

In my discussions with Lt. Colonel Heppner, Lt. Colonel Peers, Colonel Hall, Lt. Colonel Smith and Major Wilkinson and the various Branch Chiefs in the field, a number of problems were raised and requests made of comparatively minor importance, which I have covered by memorandum to and discussion with local representatives and Branches in Washington and need not be set forth in a report of this kind.

For the purpose of my over-all report, which follows, I believe it most expedient to proceed from the basis of individual Theaters and the establishments within them.

Major Frederick Willis, USMCR, Executive Officer to Colonel Lowman, Communications Branch Washington, accompanied by Major Falknor, Chief of Communications Far East, was in the field covering the same areas as myself. Accordingly I have omitted from this report discussion of the Communications Branch, its activities and problems.

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are acting as good soldiers under conditions, both climatic and political, which range from fair at best to what can only be described as frightful.

3. On the basis of pure efficiency, apart from any sentiment, our program of replacement of individuals in the Far East should be more liberal than might normally be the case. An individual who spends a year in the Far East, particularly Burma and China, and goes through a full monsoon season of heat and rain, may have his efficiency so badly affected that he should be replaced.

4. Every establishment in the Far East needs more supplies. The nature of the supplies and the degree of need, of course, vary from place to place, so that when we consider places like Chungking and Kweilin supplies of all kinds are practically non-existent. I would say that the bottleneck on supplies for the Far East is moving from Washington to the field, particularly Calcutta and the "Hump".

5. Transportation within the field is still a problem of vast importance. Within particular establishments the problem is simply one of local transportation, jeeps, trucks, etc., and personnel to man them. That is in process of being solved. In its most serious form the transportation problem is one of getting supplies over the "Hump". At the present

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ITINERARY

Attached, as Appendix "A", is a detailed schedule of my itinerary. By way of summary the following were visited:

In SEAC: Kandy, Colombo, Trincomalee, Galle and Chittagong.

In CBI: New Delhi, Calcutta, Detachment 101 (including Dinjan and Dibrugarh), Myitkyina (Burma), Chungking, Kunming and Kweilin.

I departed from Washington 2 June 1944, and from Miami, Florida, 6 June 1944, and returned to Washington, 22 August 1944.

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Before discussing particular Theaters and Detachments, I should like to make some comment common to our Far East establishments.

1. Both Theaters and all Detachments are short-handed. Almost identical comments were made every place I went, to-wit: They are working hard, too hard in some cases, and need help.
2. The morale over-all is extremely good. Occasionally there is some resentment and disillusionment with respect to Washington, but the great majority of our personnel are attempting and in most cases succeeding in doing a job. They

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**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

8 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Brig. General W. J. Donovan  
From: Lt. (jg) George C. Demas, USNR  
Subject: Report of Trip to SEAC and CBI

NATURE OF MISSION

In May of 1944, Colonel Atherton Richards, OSSTO, ordered that I proceed to both Theaters in the Far East to meet with the Strategic Services Officers and Branch Chiefs and in general familiarize myself with the makeup and activities of OSS in SEAC and CBI. It was thought that such a trip would enable me to perform my duties in Washington as Far East Theater Officer with a better understanding of the problems as they arose and to assist the Branches at this end in their servicing of the field.

Colonel Buxton, immediately prior to my departure, made it clear that my mission was purely internal; that I was not to represent Washington to the field (except as Far East Theater Officer), nor OSS to any outside agency or authority.

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19. My inspection trip wholly satisfied me that the initial setup as established by Colonel Lowman in the Far East, with Colonel Falkner as overall Communications Chief for CBI and SEAC, is an eminently sound and functioning one. I do not believe a communications chief for each area out there without an overall Communications Chief encompassing all of the areas could possibly do as good a servicing job, nor could it coordinate Communications policies and activities as effectively.

20. I wish to commend most highly the work which Colonel Falkner is doing in that theater. He is using good, sound judgment, a high order of diplomacy where it is necessary and lots of moral guts when that is required. He is taking it well in his stride and is not daunted or disturbed by inconsequential matters. He seemed very well liked by everyone and, of course, is completely competent in his technical knowledge and background. He was thoroughly deserving of the promotion he received and which will, I believe, help him in his operations.

21. Transportation is a crying and desperate need in all OSS operations in China. The lack of it is a severe handicapping matter at the moment.

*Frederic A. Willis*  
Frederic A. Willis  
Major, USMCR.  
Executive Officer, Communications  
Branch.

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taking many weeks and in some cases months to accomplish even through the higher echelons. Information obtained is frequently inadequate or downright incorrect. There is a considerable feeling of suspicion permeating the air and General Tai Li's agents seem to be everywhere; on every plane and in every city.

16. The present Japanese campaign, if it takes Kweilin, can well throw the American support of China back five or six hundred miles to Kunming. One's impression is that there is nothing to stop them (outside of the 14th Air Force and the Composite Wing) but parascals and fans. When I was in Kunming I saw an extensive withdrawal from the forward areas of the "Z" Forces.

17. AGFRTS is a great, if not the greatest, hope of OSS in China. Badly needed are more men and equipment but equipment is now there and considerably more men will be there by October 1st.

is READY To SET

18. The Communications Branch ~~is setting~~ up and installing one of the best Communications operating stations and establishments in China both in voice and code. However, the present Japanese advance has made it impossible for Colonel Smith to know where to establish the Communications training school or to give us instructions as to where he wants the voice and code transmitters (600 watts) placed. The whole picture was in a distinct state of flux at the time I was there which was five days after the initial preparatory evacuation <sup>of KWEILIN.</sup> There is a great deal of harassing of the air strip in Kweilin and almost daily air raids. These take up manpower, time, break circuits and schedules and fatigue the personnel.

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the Japanese for three reasons. First, they are holding their strength and power in reserve for the postwar battle for the domination and control of Chinese life and affairs. Second, they are ill-equipped, inadequately fed and armed and have poor and little transportation. Thirdly, they are pretty war-weary and I believe there is a reluctance to battle to the death against the Japanese as long as they feel the Americans may do it and as long as they can continue to get Lend-Lease aid from America.

By hearsay and general impressions from scores of sources, it is my impression that the Communist armies and influence in China are the most potent and distinctly the most virile forces there to be conjured with in the postwar period. Perhaps, also, they are the best equipped and best trained aside from any postwar help that they may receive from Russia and the undoubted influence that Russia will have in world affairs and consequently on Chinese affairs in the postwar period.

14. The Chinese battle communiques, I found, couldn't be trusted or relied upon at all. In the campaign moving south on Konyang and now Lingling the Chinese armies became very much disorganized. The infiltration of Japanese plainclothes men was rampant. Several villages were taken by them along. Needless to say Japanese espionage was also rampant. Many banks in Free China shortwave daily to their branches and other commercial houses in Japanese occupied China which opens the door wide to direct espionage <sup>VIA SUAM</sup> and communications.

15. Obtaining authorization from the Chinese to do things, getting their cooperation on the simplest matters, is almost a herculean job

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9. There are some major operations brewing out of SEAC which undoubtedly have been reported to you. They will be major ones and not small raids. SEAC is <sup>now</sup> very active in small clandestine operations of an intelligence, reconnaissance nature.

10. The potentialities of OSS operations in Burma, in China, and in SEAC depend proportionately on what role the high commands of strategy assign to those theaters. They can be great or minor depending on this fact alone.

11. OSS's opportunities to be prepared and ready in these theaters are perhaps greater than they ever were at any time in any other theater.

12. Communications equipment is flowing in steadily out there now. Our development work on the new and more appropriate type of equipment for those areas is not moving anything like as rapidly as we had hoped. (This is owing to the constant labor troubles and bogging down by the manufacturers. This is being followed up diligently by the Communications Branch, their officers being sent constantly and some permanently to the various corporations involved until the material is put out properly and in quantity.)

13. The situation in China was to me, perhaps the most interesting. This is owing to the highly involved political situation existing. My impression was that the Central Government is getting, largely, lip service from the diverse groups of Chinese national life today. These consist of Communists, the Governor of Yunnan province, and the guerrilla groups. It is my impression that many of China's armed forces are not battling

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dosen women coders are being recruited for Calcutta but it will be a couple of months before they can be recruited, trained and gotten into the field. Colonel Coughlin's 50 Communications men should all be in the theater by October 1st.

4. Constant alertness on the part of Washington must be maintained concerning the health of the men in CBI and SEAC owing to the shortages frequently caused by illness. In this respect these theaters must be viewed somewhat differently from other theaters.

5. I was not at all impressed with the medical supervision in these theaters. This applies as to the caliber of medical officer, the quantity of them, their attention to details such as mess, native help, camp sanitation, malaria control, the health and morale of the men, etc.

6. Much more care should be exercised by OSS in recruiting men for these Far East theaters. Young men are highly preferred. Energy, willingness to be assigned to almost any type of job, cheerfulness, cooperation and leadership are perhaps more important in this theater than in any other. Men's character weaknesses will show up very quickly there.

7. Detachment 101 is distinctly outstanding in its command, management, morale of personnel, activity of operations and results.

8. In both theaters and all areas I was impressed by the gulf or drop between the top commanders of a detachment and the second in command. These, in my opinion, should be materially strengthened. Our top officers are tops. (The exception to this, in my opinion, is Colonel Burns who as I stated before, is an exceptionally capable officer.)

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- C. The mess is good though simple and plain.
- D. The Galle camp is now equipped to adequately handle 35 to 50 trainees.

E. They only have a small SST-1 (transmitter and receiver) at Galle which is being currently used for intra-island administrative traffic. There is not nor do we ever consider that <sup>THIS</sup> ~~there~~ will be an expanded communications base on the island.

#### GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

1. For the most part, Communications is well staffed as to quality of officers and men. (There are only two officers who are exceptions to this statement and who have certain definite abilities that are useful in the Far East but who are not right in their present assignments. One of them might have to be removed.)

2. Communications is functioning well in all theaters in the Far East through certain sections need considerably more equipment; stock-piles are being planned and will have to be set up at Masira, Kunning and in Ceylon. This is necessary so that immediate operations can be staffed and equipped without long delays being required while men and materials are gotten there.

3. Very considerably more personnel for Communications must be sent to both CBI and SEAC. Cadets are badly needed. (These things are being taken care of now. Some 15 additional personnel, officers, civilian instructors, and enlisted men operators have been offered by cable to Falknor with request for air transportation in October.) A

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Its living conditions, like all bases in that neck of the woods, will be adequate but crude consisting principally of bachelors and hewn pretty well right out of the jungle.

B. Both of these stations are situated about three miles from the OSS main Communications headquarters and camp at Trincomalee.

C. The mess at Trincomalee is good. Living conditions, under the circumstances, are really quite comfortable and habitable. The morale is extremely high.

D. Here again, I believe the medical situation needs bolstering up. (While there is a medical officer, I was not too well impressed with his real competence, activity and sincerity in his job.)

E. Transportation at Trincomalee is again, only fair. If operations increase much, which there is every reason to believe they definitely will and quickly, Ceylon as a whole should be supplied with more adequate transportation as the distances are fairly great.

#### GALLE

A. Galle is an excellent camp, beautifully situated and being very efficiently and actively run by Major Peddicord.

B. The training schedule of the OSS tactical and combat groups at Galle is very impressive. Beginning at about 7:30 in the morning, it sometimes doesn't end until 10:30 at night. The terrain is sufficiently diverse and rugged for adequate training of all types; so are the beaches with their variety of surf and shoreline characteristics. I spent a whole day training with one of their groups, down the paths, over the cliffs, and into the sea and my personal viewpoint about their training seems well supported by other OSS officers at Kandy and elsewhere on the island.

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there who should get copies didn't always get them. (Some of these were important.) This, however, has been cleared up with Colonel Heppner and was nothing but an oversight, not intentional.

B. Colonel Heppner is apparently well liked by all of the higher echelon with whom he deals. He treats his staff with great friendliness and kindness and in consequence gets a great deal of work out of them under cheerful, pleasant conditions.

C. The mess is very good and living conditions comfortable and clean.

D. There is a constant daily stream of traffic coming in or going out, officers and enlisted men from Galle, Trincomalee, Colombo and the United States. They are well handled and well received.

E. Transportation is not very adequate and they could do with more. One or two new jeeps arrived the day I was leaving.

F. They had attached to them at the time on DS one of the most thoroughly competent, wholly versatile, men that I met in the Far East, namely, Commander Ray Pier of Field Photographic. He is universally respected and admired throughout the Far East by OSS people and really has it on the ball. Whatever more major assignment he is ever given, I am confident he will conduct with the utmost efficiency.

#### TRINCOMALEE

A. The Communications transmitter station is being completed, is extremely well located and most efficiently laid out. The receiving station, situated more than a mile from the transmitter station, was in process of being completed by a detachment of Madras engineers at the time I was there. That also is well located and will be very well installed.

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**SECRET**COLOMBO

A. OSS has a very complete main headquarters there but when I left was in process of moving to a new situation right on the shore. They have by now completed their warehouse of approximately 25,000 square feet which is between the Columbe air strip and the city itself. This has plenty of acreage for expansion if necessary. When I visited there the Detachment was under the command of Captain Clark, a most able man with whom I was highly impressed. It is now under the command of another officer who, in my opinion, cannot be compared to Captain Clark. If for any reason SEAC does not want Captain Clark in his current position, Communications will be delighted to have him at any time. This viewpoint is also endorsed by Colonel Falkner.

B. We only have a very small transmitter and receiver at Colombe used wholly for administrative traffic with Kandy and occasionally with Galle.

C. The morale of our two enlisted men is good. They do a <sup>quiet</sup> ~~quite~~ business-like daily job.

KANDY

A. The whole OSS set up in Kandy is beautifully situated, extremely well constructed, well managed and run with the least amount of fuss-frou. There is a small but good message center in one of the bashes along the main line of administrative bashes. Again, the security is fair enough considering general security in the Far East. The transmitter tower is located right next to Colonel Hoppner's bungalow up on the top of the hill. Our men are good. I found a certain amount of neglect in the distribution of information copies of cables in that all people in Communications out

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D. It was my distinct impression that OSS can win or lose its reputation in China <sup>by</sup> ~~for~~ the extent <sup>to</sup> ~~in~~ which it backs or fails to back AOFPTS. This group is on its toes as a tactical operating force. It is doing great damage to the Japanese, and the 14th Air Force and the American Chinese Composite Wing under General Vincent are almost the only evidence of really hard hitting, hard fighting tactics that I saw opposing the Japanese in China.

E. Lt. Brown, our Communications man, as well as other Communications personnel, are highly thought of by Colonel Smith who commends them in their presence repeatedly, encourages them often. They have a good set-up there in an extremely well arranged compound at the end of the air strip. The building was well designed and inside has been very well constructed for one of its type; but the outside like most Far Eastern construction has a tendency to fall off. (This because of the type of mud plaster they use -- but this should not be given very serious consideration as it is widespread everywhere.)

F. Colonel Smith is recommending two of our Communications men for decorations for the work that they did in being largely responsible for the slaughter of so many Japanese cavalry on the road and so many Japanese crossing the river in doubledeck troop carriers.

G. (More on the China situation under General Impressions later in this report.)

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Hall, liked him and considered him sincere, knowledgeable and capable of doing a good job for OSS in the right party.

**KWEILIN**

A. I arrived at Kweilin anticipating all sorts of trouble and fairly well poisoned against Colonel Smith of AGFRTS.

B. I found precisely the opposite. I found him a most likeable man, hard working (personally ambitious) sincere in his efforts to make of AGFRTS a real show. He was doing much of the work himself without any fancy staff of adjutants and legwork officers and men to do it for him. He couldn't have been more helpful in giving me information of every type. At the moment he was slightly bitter against OSS (which I soon found involved personality conflicts with two of our officers and which I doubt if there is any real remedy for as I found when I got back from Kweilin that the feeling is mutual). (THIS HAS NOW BEEN REMEDIED)

C. I found Colonel Smith's criticisms, which were sincere and dispassionately directed, almost all well grounded and justified. Colonel Falknor and I took immediate steps to correct all three of them. They were:

- (1. The removal of one officer who is a troublemaker.
2. The removal of another officer with our DF crowd who was too young and afraid of the responsibilities being placed on him, and the bolstering up of our DF staff in Kweilin.
3. The delay in transmission of information to Colonel Williams and General Chennault of the 14th Air Force in Chungking, owing to the lack of a direct teletype line from the Message Center to the 14th Air Force which I mentioned before and which I believe has already been corrected.)

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H. The transmitter is well located, guarded by Chinese soldiers, but as security is known here, it can only be considered secure in the Chinese sense as natives are inevitably wandering around, constantly passing the transmitter via paddy fields and paths.

CHUNGKING

A. In spite of spending about one hour with Commodore Miles when I arrived in Chungking and going up to Happy Valley, talking to their officers and Communications men and going into the whole setup, I profited very little either in information or impressions from my trip there. In fact I drew a cipher.

B. I did not get the feeling that morale is very high. There was no running water at the time I was there. Officers and men had been locked in the Happy Valley with no opportunity to get into Chungking proper for the past five days.

C. Transportation was the worst I found in China as the Happy Valley had not one car or jeep of its own.

D. I got the distinct impression that Miles dominates and influences the entire picture. He is tied up with General Tai Li which seems to give him such complete espionage (not military or Naval intelligence) as to make him able to control things very much to his own liking.

E. I was, frankly, not well impressed nor do I feel ~~that~~ is the big outfit in China for OSS to back and give its efforts to. I express this with due hesitancy inasmuch as the failure to get more <sup>MAY HAVE</sup> quite likely ~~BEEN~~ was my own complete failure. I was, however, well impressed with Colonel

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C. Communications is short-handed there and a good deal of illness can be expected in that valley. I presume, however, that now that Myithyina has fallen, better housing conditions will be found within the city itself with greater comfort and protection from the elements.

THE SMALL BURMA VILLAGES

A. These are small rugged outposts where a great deal of illness will necessarily be encountered and the replenishment of Communications equipment by dropping or portage such as new sets, batteries, battery chargers, etc. will have to be constantly undertaken.

KUNMING

A. The Communications transmitter is located about three miles from the OSS house in the city of Kunming. I felt we were somewhat weak on manpower here, both as to quantity and in some instances, as to quality. (Corrections are now being made in this.)

B. A direct teletype line from our transmitter to the 14th Air Force was non-existent at the time I was out there but Major McCarthy assured me that it would be installed within three weeks. It undoubtedly is in operation now.

C. The transportation to Kunming is extremely bad consisting of one jeep and one borrowed Navy one, which is not always available to us, for the whole of OSS operations.

D. In spite of the fine climate, sickness has so depleted the staff that Major McCarthy was having to attend to practically every single detail and item of operation for OSS (with the exception of actual Communications work.)

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**SECRET**SHADUZUP

A. This is combat headquarters for Stillwell's forces. The OSS basher is but one removed from General Stillwell in a most excellent situation. The Communications transmitting and receiving station is about 200 yards up and on top of the hill. It is out of virgin jungle; extremely rugged, having a hard, muddy, rooty and slippery climb uphill after every mess.

B. Here again the morale of the men is excellent, and their health fair. The equipment and its efficiency only just satisfactory; at the moment requiring replenishment. This is being done.

MYITKYINA

A. The situation here has probably changed since I was there which was during the Japanese occupation of the city. At the time I was there it consisted of nothing but an air strip, control tower, and tents surrounding the air strip pegged down in excessive mud and when the sun was out, excessive heat. The men have to dig about four feet down in the mud to put their cots in order to get away as far as possible from the heat of the canvas tents. Our operator working on his set at the time I came in was down in a hole about six feet deep with the equipment, beneath the tent. The other operator, a native, was on his cot, down with malaria.

B. The Japanese were occasionally shelling the field and we were shelling Myitkyina nearly every five minutes and bombing it as fast as the pursuit planes could take off with new bombs under their wings.

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C. The Message Center and Communications headquarters are in the main bungalow, well established and well manned (with the exception of a great deal of illness which depletes their forces.)

D. The transmitter station, out out of extremely rugged and tangled country, could well be a model for any such station in the whole of the Far East. The men have apparently shown the utmost ingenuity in making themselves comfortable, clean and sanitary with very little. Their mess is one of the finest I struck in the whole of the Far East. There is an orderliness and know-how to their operations which was distinctly impressive and I gather they have so impressed others. I wish to commend Lt. Richter most highly for his intelligent leadership, his diplomacy and his innate good sense as to how to run a station and do a job.

E. Commander Luce struck me as a competent medical officer but with that exception I think the medical attention in Assam as well as in Burma demands the utmost thought and attention on the part of OSS in Washington and I consider it imperative that much younger and much more capable men should be sent to Detachment 101 if their complement of manpower is to be maintained at anything like necessary strength. There was a great deal of malaria and Colonel Peers was insisting on every precautionary measure against it.

#### TANKAN

A. This is just a landing strip for planes to Shadusup, Myithyima, and other places. Communications had no installations there.

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B. Our new base station is in the process of construction.

The rhombic antennas were already up and the building by now undoubtedly has been completed. It is excellently built and has been directly planned for communications operations. It is situated on a high hill overlooking Communications warehouses and shops, OSS training camp and the air field to which it is in close proximity. It is about 18 miles from our main OSS house in Chittagong.

C. Transportation is rather weak in Chittagong consisting of one jeep and a weapons carrier.

D. Illness has not taken any great toll in this area. Our Sergeant in charge and Lt. Bartholomy are both doing an outstandingly fine job in establishing the station.

MAZIRA

A. Here I found the morale of the men as high if not higher than at any place in CBI or SEAC. They seem to have a keenness and awareness of the importance of their jobs. The OSS headquarters there is as strongly and well commanded as any place we have in the Far East, if not better. There is good collaboration and the results speak for themselves.

B. Colonel Raye Peers is most cooperative in every way but in my opinion he needs a good strong capable executive officer as there is quite a large gulf between his own capabilities and the next nearest in command.

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newspapers in the shipments of equipment which have gone out there and I can't explain the high morale effect on the men which this had upon their arrival. One has to be there and see what it means to them. This Branch is continuing this practice in its shipments

E. During my stay there we had two doctors examine everyone of the native employees, giving them a thorough physical examination. Approximately fifty per cent of the natives refused to be so examined and were discharged that same day and replaced by others. I know of no better example of safeguarding the men's health than this in all of the Far East.

F. There was an average amount of illness for the climate. Almost everyone of the Communications men and officers in the Theater had either been hospitalized or just come out of the hospital during my stay there. None of these illnesses are serious, <sup>but</sup> they are more or less constant and ever present threats. They definitely deplete our manpower supply and endanger operations accordingly.

G. Our relations with Colonel McGehee in Calcutta both in my personal talks alone with him and in conversations with our own Communications men, are most cordial and running smoothly.

H. From the Communications angle, transportation is good. From the other Branches' angle it is extremely poor but had improved somewhat by the time I left.

CHITTAGONG.

A. We are somewhat shorthanded in personnel in Chittagong but are sending another officer there and perhaps an enlisted man to increase our complement.

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concentrating on the business at hand and it is interesting to note that at no time either going or coming back through New Delhi did I hear him make one unfavorable remark in regard to any man in the field in any theater, nor did he beef about Washington and the way they are handling things. This I found impressive and refreshing.

D. General Reeder has taken over Signal Communications from General King; our relations with him are excellent both in New Delhi and Calcutta. I consider from my brief opportunity for impressions that OSS relationships in New Delhi <sup>about</sup> are perfect.

CALCUTTA

A. The Communications building in Calcutta while being huge, (and it must originally have seemed an improvident establishment) is now, in my opinion more than fully justified. It has been renovated, window-screened, modern "Indian" plumbing put in and the mess is now well managed and the men well housed.

B. At this time it is very well stocked with equipment and supplies and greatly impressed General Reeder, Colonel Neal and the British SOE and Signal officers who inspected it while I was there.

C. The transmitter and receiving station as well as the code room are now undoubtedly moved into the Communications center from Tollygunge.

D. The morale of all the men is extremely high, good facilities have been accorded them by furnishing a recreation room and piano which makes them desire to stay there in the evenings instead of going into town. Major Perry has wisely packed all sorts of magazines and Sunday

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we dropped messages at both places.

4. While I was in China I talked to Barich at Shang-jao but I was unable to visit him as it would have taken about ten days to get there, part of the trip by sampan, and I didn't know that sufficient time would be authorized me to make the trip though I strongly feel that for morale and other reasons, that all of the most outlying and even the smallest outposts should be visited to let the men know that the people back home come that far to see them and are interested in their welfare and work.

SPECIFIC IMPRESSIONS REGARDING THE FOLLOWING CITIES

NEW DELHI

- A. Our Communications setup here consists wholly of code work and direct contacts and operations with the Army Signal Center.
- B. I found the morale of the men good but they were extremely short-handed during the current illness of two of the men.
- C. I was extremely favorably impressed with Colonel Harry Berne, both as to the manner in which he was conducting his liaison work with all of the important people that OSS and Communications should keep contacts with, as well as the apparent friendship which they evidenced towards him. I interviewed a great many of these people through Colonel Berne's kindness and was also present when he was asked by Colonel Rice to accompany him and General Stratmeyer in General Stratmeyer's plane on a three day visit to Kashmir. Colonel Berne impressed me as being a thoroughly capable executive type of man.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**SECRET****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan

DATE: September 18, 1944

FROM : Major Willis

SUBJECT: Report on Recent Trip to CBI and SEAC

1. The purpose of my trip was to inspect the Communications installations in CBI and SEAC. I viewed this responsibility as encompassing more than merely a matter of technical circuits, equipment supplies and the caliber of officers and men. With this in mind I concerned myself equally with the living conditions of the men, their food and sanitation, their health, morale and whether or not they were in the right notch and assignment, also their relationships to the command to which they were attached.

2. I visited and inspected all of the Communications headquarters and installations in CBI and SEAC and a few of the more forward posts, as follows:

INDIA  
New Delhi  
Calcutta  
Chittagong

CHINA  
Kunming  
Chungking  
Kweilin

BURMA  
Shadung  
Tangkaw  
Kwitan Village  
Tailum Village  
Mawdawng Village

CEYLON  
Colombo  
Kandy  
Trincomalee  
Galle

ASSAM  
Nasira

3. At Tailum and Mawdawng we were unable to land owing to the bad condition of the air strips and fields which were under water, but

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan  
FROM : Major Willis  
SUBJECT:

15239  
DATE: September 18, 1944  
J. Edgar Hoover

Attached is a (I am afraid, very lengthy) report on my trip to the Far East.

You may prefer just to read "General Impressions" which commences on page 15.

J. Edgar Hoover

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ASSIGNMENT IN BRITAIN

BY

LEONARD S. WILSON, LT., USNR

20 OCTOBER 1944

Copy #1



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
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## FIELD REPORTS

VOL. III

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REYNOLDS, ROBERT L. 15,896	R&A	ETO	A B
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WILSON, LT. LEONARD S. 15,786	MAP DIV.	ETO	E



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**SECRET****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 19 December 1944

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Reports of Officers Returning from R&amp;A/London ✓

Attached hereto are reports of three officers and a staff member on duty with R&A/London between 12 January 1944 and 30 November 1944.

I. Map Division

A. A detailed and documented analysis of the Map Division entitled "Assignment in Britain," by Leonard Wilson, Lt., U.S.N.R., Deputy Chief. Included in this report are the following items which may be of interest:

1. R&A/Washington failed to tell R&A/London that a Map Division was being established or that any large scale R&A action was contemplated. The result was that Services Branch found itself completely unaware of the problem of procuring our supplies from the British. It is, therefore, recommended that establishment of any outpost be initially taken care of by Services/Washington and the division concerned (Appendix III.)

2. Paramount among supplies lacking in shipments from Washington are air brushes, filing cabinets, microfilm cameras, file and storage cabinets (p. 33.)

3. There are two commendations of outstanding interest, one from Prime Minister Churchill (fig. 2) and another from Queen Wilhelmina (fig. 19.)

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B. Robert Coffin, Lt. (J.G.) U.S.N.R., Assistant Chief, mentions several difficulties which he says can be traced to "Lack of real intelligence philosophy in ORS." They are

1. Not enough time was allowed for expansion in London and establishment of R&A on the continent, and coordination of outpost aims and purposes between R&A/London and R&A/Washington was never accomplished.
2. Energy was dissipated in projects without scope, for there was a lack of clear-cut organization within R&A. This led to confusion in continental operations, with respect not only to a general working program, but also to techniques.
3. Relations with Service Branch were not precise.
4. Promotions were low for R&A enlisted men.
5. By loss of personnel to various theaters, the basic structure of R&A is getting weaker and not stronger.

## II. Cartography Section

A. Robert J. Voskuil, Lt. (J.G.), U.S.N.R., Chief, has prepared a detailed report of the status of that section as of 9 October 1944.

III. The report of Dr. Robert L. Reynolds, a staff member in London, describes in some detail the accomplishment of a staff which worked with P&A. The following difficulties presented a recurring problem:

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- A. Difficulty in obtaining suitable personnel.
- B. Lack of slots in the T/O for promotions.
- C. Need for a rotation policy.

*W. B. Kantack*  
W. B. Kantack  
Capt., A.C.  
Reports Officer

Attachments

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